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Abstract
A fault-tolerant negotiation-based intersection crossing protocol is presented. Rigorous analytic proofs
are used for demonstrating the correctness and fault-tolerance properties. Experimental results validate
the correctness proof via detailed computer simulations and provide a preliminary evaluation of the
system performances. The results are compared to the ones that can be achieved via a risk estimator
with and without combining the proposed protocol. Our fault model considers packet-loss, noisy sensory
information and malicious driving. Our preliminary results show a reduction in the number of dangerous
situations and vehicle collisions.
1 Introduction
Autonomous vehicles need a way of assessing risk in order to keep their passengers and other road users safe.
Without human inputs, the vehicle has to rely on information from its sensors, and communication with
other vehicles and infrastructures. This information must then be interpreted and processed to form a view
of the current traffic situation and estimate the likelihood of a future collision, so that the vehicle can take
action if the risk gets too high.
Another method of reducing collisions is to let the vehicles follow a protocol that allows them to negotiate
their way through traffic situations where lanes either run in parallel or intersect – i.e. where critical
sections exist. One such protocol for manoeuvre negotiation was developed by Casimiro and Schiller [4]
and an extended version of this protocol is presented in this thesis. The protocol defines a priority system
where vehicles have to request permission from higher priority vehicles to enter a critical section. Granting a
request implies giving the requester higher priority. Therefore, the negotiation process provides both a way
for the requester to inform other vehicles about its intended manoeuvre and for the requester to ensure that
the other vehicles will stop for it if something goes wrong.
Instead of only focusing on collision avoidance, the protocol also tries to prevent priority violations. A
priority violation occurs if a vehicle has to either slow down or stop for another vehicle that is considered
to have lower priority according to the traffic rules. The protocol is also designed to keep vehicles safe in the
event of network failures, such as when messages are delayed or lost.
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1.1 Problem formulation
Collision mitigation for autonomous vehicles is an inherently difficult task. The risk assessments needed for
mitigating collisions have to be based on information from sensors where noise is always present. The sensors’
accuracy may further be reduced by certain weather conditions and objects blocking their view. Allowing
vehicles to broadcast their own position to other vehicles may increase the accuracy of the information
available for assessing risks. However, for this setup to have a reliable source of information, it is required
that no sensor is faulty and that no vehicle has malicious intentions.
The task of collision mitigation can also be performed by making vehicles reveal their intentions instead
of trying to infer intentions from positional data. Inferring intentions is a classification problem and it is
hard to correctly classify the intention of a vehicle that engages in unusual driving behaviour. Alternately,
if vehicle intentions are disclosed via messages, then the system can be exploited by malicious drivers.
To further reduce the number of collisions it is also important that vehicles can negotiate with each other
and not only communicate state information. Enabling negotiation implies that the vehicles can collaborate
to plan safe trajectories through the sections of road that they will share. Efficiency and fault tolerance can
be increased if the negotiating process follows a protocol. To ensure safety, the protocol must be carefully
designed and analysed, and undergo rigorous testing. Since the system requires that vehicles follow the
protocol to mitigate collisions, this setup is also vulnerable to abuse by malicious drivers.
All approaches to collision mitigation have weak points. Therefore, offsetting these weaknesses by combining
different systems with complimentary strengths is critically important if we wish to create a reliable safety
system for autonomous vehicles.
1.2 Purpose
As vehicles with autonomous abilities become more and more common, the need for more robust safety
systems increases. A lot of research have been made – and still is being made – in the area of predicting
vehicle motion and risk estimation. These predictions and estimations can be used to adjust the ego vehicles
trajectory in order to avoid collisions. Another approach to implementing a safety system is use communi-
cation, vehicle-to-vehicle or vehicle-to-infrastructure, with a protocol determining how messages should be
sent. Less time have been spent in this field and in how the two types of safety systems can be combined to
create a system less sensitive to noise and network failures etc. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute
to the latter field by providing an analytical correctness proof of a safety system based on a communication
protocol and by presenting results from running simulations with this safety system, a safety system based
on risk estimation, and the two systems combined.
1.3 Delimitations
The implementation of our safety system will only be tested in computer simulations and not on real vehicles.
Due to time limitations, the simulations in this project focus only on the highly risky manoeuvre of left turn
across the priority lane in an intersection. Another limitation considers the amount of vehicles that are
allowed to be in the intersection at the sane time, which is reflected by the number of concurrently granted
vehicles. The version of the communication protocol that is presented in this thesis only allows one held
grant per vehicle.
1.4 Disposition
A short literary review of various methods for performing risk estimation for autonomous vehicles is found in
Chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents the key concepts of the extension of the manoeuvre negotiation algorithm and
is followed by a detailed algorithm description and correctness proof in Chapter 4. The software architecture
for performing simulations are described in Chapter 6 and the evaluation setup and criteria is presented in
Chapter 7. Results from the simulations can be found in Chapter 8 which is followed by a discussion of the
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results and suggested further research in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 finally presents the main conclusions of this
thesis.
1.5 Contribution
Risk estimation for autonomous vehicles is currently a highly researched topic. A lot of effort has been put
into develop individual safety systems for particular traffic situations that could meet the strict regulations
on safety for autonomous vehicles. Combining individual safety systems to achieve higher safety has not
received much attention yet and it is this area that this thesis will make a contribution to. This thesis
presents a way to combine vehicles’ individual risk estimation with a distributed, fault tolerant manoeuvre
negotiation protocol to increase safety in intersections. The high-level abstraction of the protocol does not
limit its usage to intersections and it could potentially be used in many different traffic situations. This thesis
also presents an analytic proof of correctness for the protocol. Results from simulations where communication
loss and extra noise are added further give an insight into how well the combined safety systems preform in
non-ideal situations.
2 Related work
Risk Estimation involves three core components: inferring the behaviour of other vehicles, defining a useful
risk metric, and computing the risk based on the inferred behaviour. The aforementioned behaviour may
be a composition of the manoeuvre that the vehicle is likely to perform and whether or not it is following
traffic rules and conventions.
Detecting high-risk situations in time is vital for avoiding collisions. Another approach to collision mitigation
is to design V2V-communication protocols that prevent risky situations from occurring. Here follows a
summary of related work in the area of risk estimation and collision mitigation.
2.1 Behaviour Inference
Machine learning approaches have been shown to function well as classifiers for driver behaviour. A Re-
current Neural Network (RNN) with a Long Short Time Memory (LSTM) was used by [19] to infer
manoeuvre intention at intersections. RNNs have a feedback loop which gives them a form of memory
and LSTM cells can remember a value for an arbitrary amount of time, which is useful when predicting
manoeuvres.
A RNN classifier was also used to predict driver intention in roundabouts using short segments of LiDAR
tracking data [20].
A comparison of different classification methods for signalled intersections was performed by [2]. The authors
developed two classifiers: one based on a Support Vector Machine (SVM) combined with a Bayesian filter and
one based on Hidden Markov Models (HMMs), having trajectory parameters such as vehicle speed, lateral
position etc.
Three classification algorithms based on static time to intersection, the acceleration needed to stop at the
stop line, and if the vehicle has a high speed in relation to it’s distance from the intersection – compared
to a fitted regression curve fit to normal stop-patterns – were also evaluated. The authors found that the
SVM performed much better than all the other classification methods, with the HMM in second place. The
authors reasoned that the data sets that the HMM used to attempt to generalise driving patterns contained
large outliers which strongly affected its results. The SVM, on the other hand, tries to find a separating
boundary between the sets and thus is less affected by these same outliers.
An Intention Aware method was developed by [11] to detect unexpected behaviour in give-way intersec-
tions. Their method uses a HMM with predefined transition probabilities and a speed model of constant
speed. The behaviour of lower priority vehicles is modelled as following or not following the convention of
giving way to higher priority vehiclesi.
isee Section 6.1 for more details
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Other aspects of intention aware motion prediction involves the behaviour to follow other vehicles. An
intelligent driver model was used by [12] to account for that vehicles usually adapt to the speed of a vehicle
closely preceding it.
2.2 Risk Metrics
In this context, the commonly applied definition of risk is Time to Collision (TTC), which refers to the
time remaining until a collision will occur if no object changes its intended trajectory. The authors of [13]
relied on both TTC and another risk metric called Minimal Safety Margin (MSM) – which provides a
measure of the distance to other vehicles – and managed to detect all risky situations involving lane change
on highways in their tests. Their method involved using a Bayesian network to both account for uncertainties
and estimate risk for each of the different lanes. They combined this with time-window filtering to produce
a robust risk assessment method.
The concept of Looming was introduced by [16] to compute risk for general traffic situations – i.e. cir-
cumstances where predefined trajectories may not be available – that would perform better than mere TTC.
Looming measures how much space an object occupies in the visual field of a vehicle. A positive loom rate
signifies that the object is approaching the vehicle and vice versa. The authors used a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) trained using a combination of TTC and loom data to detect collisions.
Approaches have been made to not only detect collisions, but also distinguish more severe collisions from
minor ones. For this purpose, G. Xi et al [17] presented a situational assessment method that includes the
system’s internal energy in the risk computation. Internal energy is computed with reference to the vehicle’s
reduced mass and relative velocity, and provides an indication of the severity of a potential impact.
An interaction-aware model similar to the one in [11] is combined with aRapidly-exploring Random Tree
(RRT) classifier by [9] in an attempt to increase safety by paying more attention to the traffic environment.
The classifier interprets a traffic situation as either ”dangerous” or ”safe”, enabling a vehicle to be more
cautious in situations that are more prone to collisions.
Many Risk Estimation methods are designed for particularly defined traffic situations – such as straight
highways or 4-way intersections – but in reality, an autonomous vehicle must be able to handle many different
situations. A scenario-adaptive system was developed by Geng et al. [7] to infer driver behaviour of vehicles
in more than one traffic situation. A HMM was trained using collected data for a number of differing
behaviour classes, with each class corresponding to distinct manoeuvres (e.g. left turn at an intersection,
lane keeping etc.). With the introduction of priori information (i.e. traffic rules and conventions) and the
use of Bayesian inference, [7] also showed that the behaviour prediction time horizon could be increased by
on average 56% for lane change and 26% for long time precision. Scenarios were modelled with an ontology
model so that scenarios could be inferred using sensory information – to identify features in the environment
– and rule-based reasoning.
A model-based algorithm calculating the acceleration or steering angle needed to avoid a collision was
presented by [3]. An emergency break or lane-change manoeuvre could be triggered if the output values rise
over a set threshold in order to avoid collisions.
2.3 Traffic Coordination Algorithms
Autonomous vehicles can make use of V2V-communication to negotiate and reach an agreement over who
was the right to enter critical sections and thereby mitigate collisions. An approach using a temporarily
elected leader was presented by [15] to direct traffic in intersections. The elected leader decides which
direction will have right-of-way, analogous to a green light, until a new leader is elected. The approach
introduces a way to control traffic flow through both signalled and unsignalled intersections and was shown
to reduce traffic accidents by 70 % in simulations.
Algorithms have also been developed to find an optimal of coordinating traffic through intersections. A
Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP) algorithm was developed by [18] for this purpose. The for-
mulated distributed optimisation problem considers the times when each vehicle enters and exits the inter-
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section, as opposed to considering the complete trajectories, in order to reduce the amount of communicated
data between vehicles.
2.4 Cooperative Approaches
Detecting temporarily occluded objects is inherently hard since most (often light-based) sensors used in
vehicles cannot penetrate opaque materials. Cooperation between vehicles could potentially increase safety,
since the object that blocks the sensor’s view may actually be another vehicle. Such an approach was
developed by [14]. This approach involved vehicles using V2V-communication to inform other vehicles of
their own state as well as information about detected – possibly hidden – objects.
3 Solution
This section presents some of the main ideas that have been developed during this project and serves as
an introduction to the Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol presented in Chapter 4. The following sections will
cover the main changes made to the original Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol, introduce the concept of
priorities, describe the granting process, and explain how risk estimation is used in our system.
3.1 Adding an explicit release of a received grant
The original protocol for manoeuvre negotiation was designed from a scheduling point of view with focus
on both safety and throughput. A permission to change the traffic priorities was bound to a timer set to
a predefined manoeuvre time and the permission expired when the timer expired. This approach ensures
that no given permission last forever, thus preventing deadlocks, but it assumes that the granted vehicle
can finish its manoeuvre within the given time frame. Consider, for example, a granted vehicle pi that has
to stop in an intersection and another vehicle pj whose grant timer just expired. The protocol would then
allow vehicle pj to be granted access to the intersection, resulting in a collision unless another safety system
successfully detects the dangerous situation in time.
3.1.1 From scheduling to setting priorities
Instead of viewing the intersection as a scheduling problem with equal focus on throughput and safety we wish
to put more focus on safety by introducing negotiable priorities not bound to timers. The first step towards
a priority oriented protocol is to remove the grant timer and to introduce an explicit 〈RELEASE〉 message
to end a grant instead. A granted vehicle will send this release message after it has left the intersection
to notify vehicles holding a grant for it to release the grant. This approach assures that a grant will not
expire too early and is able to ensure safety even if the granted vehicle slows to a stop in the intersection.
Explained from the new priority perspective, a granted vehicle is given a higher priority and none of the
granting vehicles, with lower priority, are allowed to enter the intersection until assured that the granted
vehicle has left the intersection and they themselves have received a higher priority. For more details on
prioritiesii.
The original protocol used timers to prevent deadlocks in the presence of message loss. Removing the grant
timer and introducing a new message type implies that an additional feature has to be introduced in order
to keep preventing deadlocks. The solution we propose is to let the granting vehicles regularly calculate
if the granted vehicle has left the critical section. In this project the calculations are based on positional
and road map data sent or shared between vehicles, but it would also be possible to use LiDAR, cameras,
and other perception tools for autonomous vehicles for this purpose. A granting vehicle that calculates that
the granted vehicle has left the intersection will release the grant in the same way as if it had received a
〈RELEASE〉 message. A lost 〈RELEASE〉 message will thereby not cause a deadlock.
iisee Section 3.2
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3.2 Priorities
The concept of priorities is used by vehicles to determine if they have the right to perform certain manoeuvres
when other vehicles are present. More specifically, priorities determine who has the right of way when the
planned trajectories of two vehicles intersect.
Priorities can be determined by traffic rules or be indicated by, for example, traffic lights. The former type
of priorities do not change over time and we refer to them as static priorities. The latter priorities are time
dependent and we refer to them as dynamic priorities.
Here, we define priorities as the order in which vehicles will be allowed to enter the intersection. The priority
order depends on which lane the vehicles are in and how far in space and time they are from the intersection.
Our system is based on dynamic priorities where vehicles’ priorities are negotiated through our manoeuvre
negotiation protocol. Static priorities determined by traffic rules are used as a base state for our dynamic
priority system. This section further explains the concept of priorities and how it is used in the Manoeuvre
Negotiation Protocol.
3.2.1 Priority matrix
The Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol relies on manoeuvre specific memberships, which for a vehicle pi are all
the vehicles with higher priority than pi when pi wishes to perform the manoeuvre bound to the membership.
The default priorities in the negotiation protocol are decided by traffic rules. For an intersection, the traffic
rules can be summarised in what we refer to as a priority matrix. Each lane leading to the intersection is
assigned a priority matrix, where rows correspond to possible manoeuvres and columns represent the other
directions into the intersection. Every cell takes on the value True or False. A False implies that a vehicle
coming from the direction associated with the matrix and intending to do the manoeuvre described by the
row, must ask the agents coming from the lane corresponding to the column for permission to change the
traffic priorities temporarily. An example of a priority matrix for vehicles on a straight priority road in a
4-way intersection can be found in Figure 3.1. Vehicles in a lane on the priority road must ask for permission
to temporarily change the traffic priorities from vehicles in the opposing lane only if they intend to do a left
turn across path, indicated by the False at the top of the first column. The priority matrix for the opposing
lane going in the opposite direction will in in this case be the same since the intersection is symmetrical.
Vehicles approaching the intersection from a non-priority road will have priority matrix different from the
one for vehicles on the priority road.
3.2.2 Priority levels
All vehicles approaching an intersection can be put in a hierarchical order of priority. This order can be
visualised as levels on a scale, where the top level determines the group of vehicles that currently have
permission to enter the intersection, which are the vehicles with the highest priority. Vehicles in a group of
lower priorities will have to wait for higher priority vehicles to exit the intersection before they can enter. This
rule is just a direct translation from what the traffic priorities say but the introduction of this concept makes
it easier to visualise and perhaps comprehend. The introduction of the Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol
enables vehicles to negotiate with the higher priority vehicles for a temporary rise in its priority and a safe
passage through the intersection.
It is worth noting that there can be as many priority levels as there are vehicles on the road since the levels
represent an observer’s perspective. A vehicle’s perspective, however, only needs a maximum of 3 levels
corresponding to higher, equal or lower priority than the ego vehicle. This is because a vehicle only needs
to compare its own priority to others to navigate through traffic since it just needs to know which vehicles
to give way to.
3.2.3 Priority violation
The two main ideas of the Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol is firstly to let traffic flow in a way similar to
when the protocol is not in use when there are no communication failures. Secondly, when communication
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Figure 3.1: A priority matrix for the green vehicle coming in from the left on the priority road. A False
infers that the green vehicle has lower priority for the turn described by the row in relation to the lane
described by the column.
Figure 3.2: The green vehicle coming from the left is granted to temporarily increase its priority level. The
green vehicle is now allowed to enter the intersection
7
failures are present, the protocol is meant to add an extra layer of safety by making the vehicles follow
the negotiated dynamic priorities. If, for example, a vehicle has been granted to rise its priority but some
circumstance causes the vehicle to stop in the intersection, then other vehicles will not be allowed to enter
the intersection until they can confirm that the granted vehicle has left it. This may cause vehicles that
initially had higher priority (as specified by traffic rules) to slow down or stop for initially lower priority
vehicles. We refer to such events as priority violations.
The first main idea can be reformulated to say that priority violations will be avoided when there are no
communication failures. To achieve this, our negotiation protocol use the functions noPriorityViolationStrict
and noPriorityViolationDynamic to determine if a manoeuvre can be performed without leading to a priority
violation. The former takes normal and unusual driving patterns into account while the latter only considers
normal driving patterns. More details of the two functions and their usage areas are provided in Section
3.2.4 (Section A for an alternative approach) and 3.2.5.
3.2.4 Algorithm Details of noPriorityViolationStrict
noPriorityViolationStrict is used to calculate which vehicles pj that have higher priority than pi – where
priorities are defined by the priority matrix for the intersection– and could possibly reach the intersection
in the time tmax it takes for pi to both request a priority change and perform its manoeuvre through the
intersection. In order to account for unusual driving behaviour, we defined a threshold distance dmax such
that any vehicle starting from a distance d > dmax away from the intersection will not be able to reach it
within tmax time units.
The implementation of noPriorityViolationStrict(pi, pj), for two vehicles pi and pj , first determines if pi has
higher priority than pj according to the priority matrix and if so returns True. If pi has lower priority the
procedure returns True if and only if pj is further than dmax length units away from the intersection.
3.2.5 Algorithm details of noPriorityViolationDynamic
The implementation approach of noPriorityViolationDynamic makes an assumption about driver behaviour
in order to try to increase throughput. This approach requires predefined trajectories and speed models
corresponding to the manoeuvres going straight, turning left or right, and stopping.
Let pi and pj be two vehicles approaching an intersection. A call to
noPriorityViolationDynamic(pi, turni, pj) will return True if the vehicles are estimated to never be in the
intersection at the same time. The estimation of time period spent in the intersection – here called the
occupation interval – is performed for both vehicles but the process is here described for pj only to avoid
duplication. Normal driving pattern for pj ’s current intended manoeuvre is used to estimate the time it will
take pj to reach the intersection (TTIj) and the time it will take for it to leave the intersection (TTEj). The
occupancy interval for pj is then defined as Oj = [TTIj , TTEj ]. The intention of pj may be unknown,
in which case Oj is a set consisting of the predicted intervals for each of the four driving manoeuvres. An
additional margin of χ(TTIj−T ) – where T is the current time and χ is a constant – is subtracted from each
TTIj and a margin of χ(T − TTEj) is added to each TTEj to help avoid near collisions. The constant χ
affects the uncertainty in the estimation of Oj . Thus, more uncertainty is added to Oj for an agent pj that is
further away in time from the intersection than an agent that is closer. This increase in uncertainty accounts
for some deviations from the defined normal driving pattern. We define Oj as the increased occupancy
interval for an agent pj .
In the next step, the increased occupancy intervals for pi and pj , Oi and Oj , are compared to evaluate the
traffic situation. No priority violation is estimated to occur between pi and pj if Oi ∩ Oj = ∅.
This approach cannot guarantee that no priority violation – and thereby that no collisions – will occur if
vehicles exhibit behaviour that deviates extremely from the normal driving patterns and priorities are kept
static. However, enabling priorities to be dynamic by introducing negotiation according to the Manoeuvre
Negotiation protocol ensures that no collision will occur as long as all vehicles follow the protocol. This
implementation of noPriorityViolationDynamic is therefore suitable for use during the negotiation process
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when agents make decisions on granting or denying another agent. The approach provides higher throughput
than the approaches presented in Section 3.2.4 and A.
Algorithm 1: noPriorityViolationDynamic relying on dynamic priorities for safety
1 Structures:
2 AgentState = (ta, x, v, a); // timestamp, position, velocity, acceleration
3
4 Interfaces:
5 getT imeToIntersection(p[, turn]): ;
6 getT imeToExit(p, TTI[, turn]): ;
7
8 procedure getOccupationInterval(p, turn = None) begin
9 let TTI = getT imeToIntersection(p, turn);
10 let TTE = getT imeToLeave(p, TTI, turn);
11 let TTI = TTI − (TTI − p.ts)χ;
12 let TTE = TTE + (TTE − p.ts)χ;
13 return [TTI, TTE]
14 procedure noPriorityViolationDynamic(pi, turni, pj) begin
15 let TTIi, TTEi = getOccupationInterval(pi, turni);
16 let TTIj , TTEj = getOccupationInterval(pj);
17 if ((TTIi ≥ TTIj) ∧ (TTIi ≤ TTEj)) ∨ ((TTIj ≥ TTIi) ∧ (TTIj ≤ TTEi)) then return True ;
18 else return False;
19 return unsafeAgents ;
3.3 Deciding to grant or deny
In our system the traffic priorities at any point in time are determined by the static traffic rules and the
dynamic changes of priorities established by the manoeuvre negotiation protocol. A vehicle that wants to
perform a manoeuvre that would change the current traffic priorities will therefore have to ask for permission
to do so from all vehicles in its membership. The choice of reply to a request, either 〈GRANT 〉 or 〈DENY 〉,
depends on the output of the function noPriorityViolationDynamic which computes occupation intervals –
time intervals in which the requester and requestee are predicted to be inside the intersection.
3.3.1 Predicting intersection occupation intervals
The prediction of our occupancy intervals used in noPriorityViolationDynamic are based on normal driving
patterns defined as a speed model, see Figure 3.3. The speed model defines the ideal speed based on a
vehicle’s intention and its distance from the intersection. Starting from the most recently known position
at time T of a vehicle pi, the time to reach the intersection, TTIi, and time to exit the intersection, TTEi,
is computed using the speed v determined by the speed model and by integrating 1/v from the current
position up until reaching the intersection. The uncertainty constant χ, which reflects how well we believe
that vehicles follow the speed model, was set to 0.25 here since the vehicles in our simulation do not deviate
much from the speed model.
3.3.2 noPriorityViolationDynamic’s role in the grant decision
A Requestee calls the interface noPriorityViolationDynamic presented in Algorithm 1 to determine if it’s safe
to grant the requester. The interface calculates the occupation intervals Oi and Oj for the requestee pi and
the requester pj and calculates the gap ∆tgap between them when put on the same time line, see Figure
3.4. Any overlap in the intervals, ∆tgap < 0, signifies a higher collision risk and will result in a returned
False causing pi to reply with a 〈DENY 〉. No overlap among the two time intervals results in a returned
True which enables pi to continue checking the other state related criteria needed when making the grant
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Figure 3.3: A speed model defining ideal speed v for a vehicle based on its distance from the intersection
dIntersection and intention which can be either going straight, turning left or stopping. The model is based
on alternating constant speed and constant acceleration.
.
decisioniii.
Figure 3.4: Two occupancy intervals for agent pi and agent pj with added safety margins. The time gap
∆tgap is evaluated as the smallest gap between the two intervals outer margins.
3.4 Risk estimation interfaces
The manoeuvre negotiation protocol needs risk estimation in order to provide safety, especially when devia-
tions and failures are present in the system. Three main usage areas for risk estimation will be presented in
this section where the risk estimation can be provided to the manoeuvre negotiation protocol in the form of
interfaces.
3.4.1 Decide when to grant or deny a request
The receiver of a priority change request has to decide whether to reply with a 〈GRANT 〉 or a 〈DENY 〉.
The decision has to be based on how much risk is involved with the proposed change of priority. In this case
we define high risk as an overlap in the estimated time intervals of when the requester and requestee will be
in the intersectioniv.
iiisee Section 5.1.2
ivsee Section 3.3
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3.4.2 Decide when enough responses have been received
The negotiation process relies on memberships to ensure that all agents necessary for ensuring safety are
involved in a negotiation process. The memberships are dynamic and are recalculated every TM time units.
A membership retrieved just before sending a request may therefore change within the 2TD time units that
the requesting vehicle waits for replies. Some agents may be added and some removed from the membership.
An agent that is removed during the waiting time may cause the requesting vehicle to wait unnecessarily,
since an agent removed from the membership does not have higher priority anymore and their (possibly lost)
reply is no longer relevant. A requesting agent should therefore filter the received replies to check if it has
got replies from the intersection of the set of agents in the membership valid when the request was sent D
and the current membership MS to avoid this waiting period. More formally, the vehicle needs to check if
D∩M ∩R = φ, where R is D minus the agents that have responded to the latest request and φ is the empty
set.
3.4.3 Risk estimation as a background process
In the real world, outside simulations, one cannot assume that all vehicles will follow an ideal trajectory and
follow the traffic rules at all times. An autonomous vehicle thus need to be able to detect a deviating and
possible malicious vehicle and perform needed action in time to avoid a collision. Continuously running a
risk estimation procedure, that can perform long-term predictions, as a background process increases the
chances of detecting these deviating vehicles in time to avoid a collision. For this thesis we are using a
slightly modified version of the risk estimation procedure presented in [11]v. We refer to this process as the
Risk Estimator. When the Risk Estimator detects a risk over 75% then it triggers an emergency breakvi.
3.4.4 Interconnected risk estimator and manoeuvre negotiation
The change of priorities achieved with the manoeuvre negotiation protocol must be recognised by the risk
estimator since the risk estimator uses priorities to calculate risk. For example, a vehicle pi on the priority
road that have granted another vehicle pj should not detect a high risk when pj enters the intersection before
pi since pi has agreed to give pj higher priority. If the risk estimator would not be made aware of the priority
change then, depending on the time gap, it might detect a high risk since pj would be seen as a low-priority
vehicle doing a turn in front of a high-priority vehicle.
The protocol calls the interface ntfyEstimat defined in Figure 5.1 with grant to tell the risk estimator about
the priority change. The risk estimator puts the granted vehicle in a grant list identifying vehicles with
higher priority, until the interface ntfyEstimat is called again from the protocol with revoke.
4 The Manoeuvre Negotiation Algorithm
4.1 System Settings
Traffic rules regulate entry allowances to avoid ambiguity and reduce collision risk when two or more vehicles
arrive at an intersection’s border. Each vehicle has to arrive at the intersection border in a way that allows
the driver to observe all other road users that they must give way to. It is allowed to enter and cross the
intersection before higher priority vehicles as long as it does not violate their priority – i.e. either cause a
collision or force the higher priority vehicles to change speed, path or trigger their safety systems to perceive
risk.
We consider a road intersection with predefined priorities. These priorities are determined by the give way
traffic rules, such that whenever two vehicles have intersecting paths, one of them has a predefined (strictly)
higher priority that depends on the incoming lanes of the two vehicles.
vsee Section 6.3.3
visee Section 6.3.3 for its definition of risk
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An agent is a computing and communicating entity that assists in deciding whether a vehicle may cross the
intersection. Such algorithmic agents can be components in a distributed automated driving system. Note
that our model assumes that all vehicles are controlled by these agents and it does not focus on how to deal
with malicious agents in a way that can represent (careless) human drivers, since we assume that all agents
are attentive and follow the traffic rules. We also assume that the agents periodically transmit information
about their whereabouts over communication channels that are prone to failures.
Agents can perform manoeuvres concurrently, such that each agent performs a sequence of manoeuvres;
one manoeuvre at a time. Agents have autonomous abilities that enable them to keep to their lanes and
to not drive too close to the vehicles in front of them in the same lane. We assume that the agents have
collision avoidance mechanisms. However, these mechanisms cannot facilitate (comfortable) intersection
crossings since these mechanisms do not assess the risk of entering the intersection in a way that violates the
traffic rules. For example, each agent must give way to higher priority traffic. This work focuses on agents’
obligations to stop, if necessary, and let higher priority agents proceed. The exact decision as to whether a
complete stop is needed depends on the traffic rules and situation. This can be determined by a separate
algorithmic (non-distributed) component for risk estimation, such as the one by Lefèvre et al. [11], which
in turn depends on manoeuvre prediction and other components. Our model assumes access to such a risk
estimator and that the vehicle changes its speed (but not its path) whenever risk is perceived.
Definition 4.1 Suppose that agent pi must give way to agent pj since pi has lower priority than pj. We
say that a priority violation has occurred if, and only if, pi decides to enter and cross the intersection before
pj in a way that causes pj’s risk estimator to observe the need to reduce speed.
We note that in the presence of aberrant behaviour – such as that caused by vehicular malfunction or mali-
cious intent – it is impossible to guarantee that no priority violation (Definition 4.1) will occur. For example,
a vehicle may enter an empty intersection without any approaching vehicle in sight. Any aberrant event may
then cause the vehicle to come to a permanent halt within the intersection, thereby blocking the way for other
vehicles. For the sake of making the scope manageable, Assumption 4.1 states that such events do not oc-
cur. Our model assumes that agent pk has access to the function noPriorityViolationDynamic(@parameters),
where @parameters refers to timed information about the computational context, such that Assumption 4.1
is respected. The time aspects defines a time horizon and concerns the time it will take a requesting agent
to send and receive answers to a request and how long it will take to perform the requested manoeuvre. The
function noPriorityViolationDynamic must then evaluate the situation up until this time horizon.
We have considered two different implementations of noPriorityViolationDynamic that provide different ac-
curacy to throughput ratios. The first solution is based on patterns for normal driving in approaching an
intersection. Speed models are used to estimate when vehicles will enter and exit the intersection. Vehicles
deviating from the normal driving pattern are accounted for by adding an extra safety margin based on how
far into the future the entry and exit occurs. Overlaps in the estimated intervals implies a potential priority
violation. This approach is elaborated in Section 3.2.5.
The second approach is based on occupancy prediction [1] and should be able to identify more situations
in which priority violations can occur. However, the accuracy of predicting a future priority violation is
favoured over keeping the throughput through the intersection high. Further details are given in Section A.
Assumption 4.1 Suppose that the requester agent pi requests a permission at a time ti from all relevant
requestee agents that have a higher priority. Moreover, pj receives pi’s request at time tj, asserts that
noPriorityViolationDynamic(AR, turn) = True and then replies to pi with a 〈GRANT 〉, where tj is between ti
and ti + TD, and TD is a bound on the communication delay of a message sent from one agent to another.
Furthermore, by the time t′i, agent pi has received 〈GRANT 〉 replies from all the relevant agents, where t′i
is a time between ti and ti + 2TD. In this case, we assume that the fact that agent pi starts crossing the
intersection immediately after time t′i, implies that it is safe to cross and no priority violation will occur.
We note that some benign violations of Assumption 4.1 are not deemed to violate system safety as a whole.
Specifically, consider the case where agent pi, before time t′i, stays outside the intersection and immediately
after time t′i starts crossing the intersection and halts (unexpectedly and without a notification) before
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completing the manoeuvre. The use of a risk estimator, such as the one by Lefèvre et al. [11], allows ample
time for the arriving agent pj to safety avoid a crash with pi. To the end of accommodating the ability
of avoiding such benign violations of Assumption 4.1, we assume that the algorithm can notify its (local)
risk estimator module (by calling ntfyEstimat(state) : state ∈ {grant, revoke}) about temporary changes to
the priority setting. E.g., if pj grants pi a permission to cross the intersection before itself then pj calls
ntfyEstimat(grant), and once pj learns about pi’s exit from the intersection then pj calls ntfyEstimat(revoke).
In detail, Lefèvre et al. [11] refer to behaviour that is expected from the agent pj when it has a priority
over pi. We simply assume that this priority information is an input to the risk estimator module that can
change during the period in which pi is granted a permission to cross the intersection before pj . We note
that without this assumption, a risk can be falsely detected if pi starts to cross the intersection before pj .
4.1.1 Synchrony in the presence of communication failures
All agents have access to a universal clock. We assume that the system uses mechanisms for omitting
messages that do not arrive in a timely manner. That is, a timely message is delivered at most TD time units
after being sent. Non-timely messages are not processed by the algorithm. Let E be a system execution
in which any sent message is delivered in a timely manner, i.e., no message is lost or omitted, and all
delivered messages are sent during E. In this case, we say that E is a synchronous execution. All other
executions are simply referred to as non-synchronous. We assume that during non-synchronous executions,
the communication is fair. That is, any message that is sent infinitely often arrives infinitely often in a
timely manner. However, we do not bound the time between two consecutive timed message arrivals. We
note that the latter implies unbounded, yet finite, message delays. Since we consider the general context of
wireless communication, we assume that the system without notice can reach a non-synchronous execution
for any unbounded (yet finite) period.
4.1.2 Task requirements
The correctness proof will demonstrate both safety (Requirements 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5) and progres-
sion (Requirement 4.6) for synchronous executions. For the case of non-synchronous executions, the proof
considers the demonstration of safety (without considering progression).
4.1.3 Limitations
For the sake of simple presentation, we make the following assumptions. We assume that an agent can
request only one manoeuvre at a time since we consider the task of multiple manoeuvre requests to be
related to planning. We consider a system that at any time allows at most one grant to a single agent;
systems that consider concurrent grants are relevant extensions to the proposed solution. Once an agent
is granted a permission to perform a manoeuvre, we require the system to allow the agent to either (i)
finish this manoeuvre within TMan time units or (ii) to communicate its position in a timely manner to
all agents that might collide with it (and by that notify them about the delay in the termination of the
manoeuvre). We note that a possible extension to the proposed solution exists in which the system can
suspect any granted agent that does not fulfil (i) and (ii) to be faulty. Such extensions can, for example,
trigger a recovery procedure that makes sure that the road (intersection) is clear before revoking the grant
and resuming normal operation.
4.1.4 Cloud-based membership service
Requirement 4.1 considers a Cloud-based service that computes new memberships every TM time units and
performs the computation on state data sent periodically from all agents to a storage service. A membership
for an agent pi contains a set of identifiers of agents pj whose: (i) path can interest with the one of pi’s
paths, and whose (ii) lane has equal or higher priority than pi’s lane, and whose (iii) distance to pi is at most
dmax length units. Since the priorities are determined by direction specific traffic rules, we assume that the
membership information provides one membership per possible manoeuvre through the intersection.
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The Cloud-based service associates a timestamp ts with every instance M of a membership. The timestamp
of the oldest agent state data of the agents in M determines ts. Moreover, we say that M is fresh if
T < ts + 2TM , where T is the current time. When agent pj appears in pi’s fresh membership M , we say
that pj may cause a priority violation with pi.
Every membershipM of an agent pi is also associated with a boolean valueMO, which we call theManoeuvre
Opportunity indicator. The membership service setsMO = True to indicate that all agents in the membership
set are within the maximum communication range of pi or that the provided membership for some other
reason should not be considered valid. Note that the latter assumption allows the Cloud-based service, when
needed, to indicate that the functionality offered by the proposed solutions is temporarily unavailable due to
some implementation constraints. A concrete implementation of the proposed solution might, for example,
require the assumption of an upper bound, Nmax, on the number of vehicles that can occupy the considered
traffic scenario due to limitations related to space, and communication range. In addition to violations of
Nmax, other constraints could consider the occurrence of failures or limitations on velocities in which the
offered functionality cannot be considered feasible and safe.
Requirement 4.1 (Membership Service) Let M be a membership for an
agent pi that has a manoeuvre opportunity at a time T and M is fresh: T < ts + 2TM . We require that M
contains all agents that could potentially lead to a priority violation with pi from T to T + 2TD + TMan.
4.1.5 Requester-to-requestee dialogue
We consider a pair of distributed state-machines that the requester and requestees execute; cf. agents pi, and
respectively, pj in Figure 4.1. We require that these agents use noPriorityViolationDynamic() in a way that
allows using Assumption 4.1 safely and repeatedly. To that end, there is a need to take into consideration
both 〈DENY 〉 messages and temporary timing failures due to the occurrence of non-synchronous executions.
Therefore, the requester automaton includes a pair of states for facilitating a persistent transmission of
request messages 〈GET 〉. Thus, whenever it is time to send a request, the requester enters the state GET
directly or passes through state TRY GET first before reaching state GET . From state GET pi repeatedly
multicast to all relevant requestees the message 〈GET 〉. Moreover, once requester pi recognise that it has
received a 〈DENY 〉 message, pi defers communication by entering the state TRY GET and stays there
until it is time to return to GET . We note that all agents play both roles of requesters and requestees;
the proposed solution does not distinguish between these roles. For the sake of simple presentation, the
requirements presented here mostly follow the above role separation with one exception; Requirement 4.3
refers explicitly to the case in which a requester receives a request and thereby also has to play the role of a
requestee.
Requirement 4.2 (Request Initialisation) Consider an agent pi that aims to perform a manoeuvre
through an intersection and a membership M that corresponds to the direction of that manoeuvre. We
require pi to first request a permission from all agents in M according to the required dialog presented in
Assumption 4.1. Moreover, we allow pi to initiate such a request if (i) M is fresh, and (ii) MO = True.
Otherwise, we require pi to check conditions (i) and (ii) within TA time units.
Requirement 4.3 uses the term status when referring to the automaton state and assumes that the state
of an agent can encode the identifier of the agent to which it has granted a permission. It also assumes
the existence the function myPriority(m) that can arbitrate between two concurrent requests. This function
returns True if the current request of the calling agent has higher priority than the request encoded by
message m. The implementation of myPriority() can depend on the directions of the relevant agents, the
time in which their requests were initiated as well as the agent identifiers.
Requirement 4.3 (Granting and Denying) Suppose that the requester agent pi multicasts a permission
request, message m = 〈GET 〉, at a time ti, to all requestee agents in D = M , where M is pi’s fresh
membership at the time ti for which there is a positive indication for a manoeuvre opportunity. Moreover, pj
receives pi’s request at a time tj, where tj is between ti and ti +TD. We require agent pj to call the function
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Grant example
Deny example
(iii) period of maneuver activity 
(i) request period
(ii) grant period
Requester pi
Requestees pj and pk
Requester pi
Requestees pj and pk
Requester: NORMAL
GET
EXECUTE
appl: request
send: nothing
recv: DENY
send: RELEASE
NORMAL
TRYGET
upon timeout
recv: nothing
send:RELEASE
Requestee: GRANT
recv: GET 
noPriorityViolation()
call: ntfyEstimat(grant)
send:GRANT
recv: RELEASE
call: ntfyEstimat(revoke) 
send: nothing
NORMAL
recv:GET 
 noPriorityViolation()
send:DENY
fresh 
membership
MO
noPriority
Violation()
true
false
upon timeout
NORMAL
Figure 4.1: The dialog between the requester and the requestee depicted by the state-machines above and
below respectively. Examples for grant and deny processes are described in the message sequence charts
provided above and below respectively. The grant example also shows the periods in which (i) the request
is ongoing, (ii) the grant has changed the state of the requestees so that the requester has the priory over
the requestees, and (iii) when the manoeuvre is performed.
ntfyEstimat(grant) and reply with a 〈GRANT 〉 to pi if, and only if, noPriorityViolationDynamic() = True and:
(i) pj’s status is NORMAL or TRY GET , (ii) pj’s status is GRANT and its state encodes that the grant
is already given to pi, or (iii) pj’s status is GET (pi and pj have concurrent requests) and pi has the higher
priory according to myPriority(m). Otherwise, pj replies to pi with a 〈DENY 〉 message.
Requirement 4.4 (Releasing) Let pi, pj, D, and M be defined as in Requirement 4.3. We require agent
pi to multicast a release message, 〈RELEASE〉, to all requestee agents pj in D only in the following cases:
(i) pi’s status is GET and it receives a message 〈DENY 〉 from pj ∈ D ∩M , (ii) pi’s status is GET and
its timer expires so that it needs to defer its requests by changing status to TRY GET , (iii) pi’s status is
EXECUTE and it has just left the intersection, and (iv) case (iii) of Requirement 4.3 occurs. We also
require agent pj to call ntfyEstimat(revoke) only in two special occasions. The first occasion is when pj status
is GRANT , its state encodes that it has granted permission to agent pi and it has just received the message
〈RELEASE〉 from agent pi. The second occasion occurs when pj’s status is EXECUTE and pj has left
the critical section.
Consider an agent pi that has requested a permission from all agents in D (when the value of pi’s membership
set was D, cf. Requirement 4.2). Suppose that G is the set of agents whose responses arrived to pi from
pj ∈ D within 2TD−TA time units, and M is pi’s current membership. We say that pi is fully-granted when
(i) G ⊇ D ∩M and (ii) all the agents in G responded with a 〈GRANT 〉 or if at least 2TD time units have
passed since the request was first sent (to the agents in D). Whenever G includes an agent that responded
with a 〈DENY 〉, we say that pi is fully-denied. In all other cases, we say that pi’s request is pending.
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Requirement 4.5 (Allowing and Deferring Manoeuvres) We require the agent pi to: (i) only perform
a manoeuvre that is fully-granted and to send a release message upon its completion, and (ii) in the case of
a fully-denied manoeuvre, send a release message to all agents in D and restart the request process after TA
time units.
Suppose that there is a (possibly unknown, yet finite) bound, Tadmissible, such that a period of Tadmissible
time units in which pi’s membership is fresh and empty implies (i) a safe crossing opportunity for pi during
that period (in the sense that pi’s membership is empty, the manoeuvre opportunity indicator is True and
it has not granted any request for a period that overlaps with this period of Tadmissible time units) and that
(ii) agent pi has the time to perform the manoeuvre (in the sense that pi has the time to notice that its
membership is fresh and empty, and the manoeuvre opportunity indicator is True). We call such a crossing
opportunity an admissible crossing opportunity. We note that the fulfilment of Requirement 4.1 implies the
existence of Tadmissible.
Requirement 4.6 (Progression) Let E be a synchronous system execution in which admissible crossing
opportunities occur infinitely often (for every direction of the intersection). Moreover, suppose that, infinitely
often, the agents that are the closest to the intersection, aim at crossing the intersection. Then, a fully-granted
agent crosses the intersection infinitely often.
The constants considered in the proposed algorithms and that are mentioned in the Theorems and Lemmas
are provided in Table 5.1.
5 Algorithms
The time constants used in the proposed algorithms are provided in Table 5.1. The following internal size
order is implied: TMan > TD ≥ TA and TM > TA.
TM Period of membership protocol
TA Period of agent registry update
TD Upper bound on transmission delay between vehicles
TMan Upper bound on manoeuvre execution time
Table 5.1: Time constants used in Algorithm 2 and 3. Observe that we assume that TMan > TD ≥ TA and
TM > TA.
5.1 Algorithm description
This section provides a line by line description of the Membership Algorithm (Algorithm 2) and Manoeuvre
Negotiation Algorithm (Algorithm 3).
5.1.1 Description of the Membership Algorithm
The Membership Algorithm (Algorithm 2) periodically updates the membership set for every vehicle
in a specified geographical section called a segment. A membership set holds multiple memberships. A
membership in the membership set for a vehicle pi consists of a set called Safety Membership (SM) made
up of the IDs of all other vehicles of higher priority in the same segment of the road, a flag called Manoeuvre
Opportunity (MO) that indicates whether or not the membership is valid, and a time stamp. There has to
be one membership per manoeuvre pi can perform in the segment since traffic priorities are manoeuvre-based
and we want the protocol to preserve the initial traffic priorities if possible. The segment in this case is a
4-way intersection. The possible manoeuvres therefore correspond to turning left, going straight, and turning
right.
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Algorithm 2: The membership algorithm.
1 Structures:
2 Segment = (xs, xe); // positions: start, end
3 AgentState = (ta, x, v, a); // timestamp, position, velocity, acceleration
4 Agent = (aID, AS); // agent ID, AgentState structure
5 Membership = (tm,MO,SM); // timestamp, MO flag, SM IDs of agents in the membership
6 Constants:
7 sID: the segment ID;
8 S := getSegmentData(sID); // Segment registry
9 Variables:
10 MR← ∅; // Membership registry
11
12 Interfaces:
13 clock(): read current time;
14 getSegmentData(sID): read Segment registry for segment sID from the storage service;
15 getARSet(sID): read all Agent Registries for segment sID from the storage service;
16 storeMR(aID,MR): write MR (Membership registry) for agent aID on the storage service;
17 getHigherPriorityAgents(AR, t): uses noPriorityViolationStrict (Section 3.2.4) to obtain the sets of agents with whom the agent
aID identified by AR may cause a priority violation for the different possible turns defined by getPossibleTurns(AR). We
assume that this set includes all the agents of higher priority than aID that could possibly arrive to the intersection by the
time t;
18 getReachableAgents(AR, t): obtain the set of agents that will be within communication range from the agent identified by AR
until t. ;
19 getPossibleTurns(AR): obtain a list of possible turns for an agent;
20
21 do forever (once in every TM time units) begin
22 let A = getARSet(sID()) ;
23 foreach AR in A do
24 if AR.AS.x > S.xs ∧AR.AS.x < S.xe then
25 let t = clock();
26 let U = getHigherPriorityAgents(AR, t+ 2TM + 2TD + TMAN ) ;
27 let R = getReachableAgents(AR, t+ 2TM + 2TD + TMAN ) ;
28 foreach turn in getPossibleTurns(AR) do
29 let tmin = min(α.AS.ta : (α ∈ A) ∧ (α.aID ∈ U [turn])) ;
30 if U [turn] ⊂ R then MR[turn]← (tmin,True,U) else MR[turn]← (tmin,False, ∅);
31 storeMR(AR.aID,MR) ;
The Membership Algorithm provides a periodic update of memberships every TM time units (line 21). The
procedure starts by retrieving all agent registries of the vehicles in the selected segment from a storage server
(line 22). The algorithm iterates through these agent registers and for each agent pi checks if pi is still in
the section (line 24). If so, the algorithm calculates which agents U have higher priority than pi and may
reach the intersection in the time it would take for pi to reach and perform a manoeuvre through the same
intersection (line 26)vii. U will have 3 entries for the 3 possible manoeuvres described above. In addition to
U , the set of all vehicles R that are within communication distance from pi are determined (line 27). The
earliest time stamps tmin of the agent states in U [turn] for each specific turn are also determined (line 29).
These time stamps will be used as a measure of how current the memberships are. A tmin far back in time
indicates that the membership was calculated using old data and that the membership may be too old to be
used safely.
The next step is to determine the value of the MOs for the manoeuvre specific memberships. MO is set to
True if and only if all agents in U are also in R (line 30), which implies that all agents that pi can cause
a priority violation for are also reachable by pi. It’s also possible to use the MO-flag to indicate that the
provided memberships are invalid due to, for example, limited capacity of the membership service.
The value assigned to SM depends on the value ofMO. SM is assigned the value of U [turn] for the specific
manoeuvre described by turn if MO = true, and is assigned the empty set if MO = false (line 30). The
viiFor more details see Section 3.2.4
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Data types:
MessageType ∈ {GET,DENY,GRANT,RELEASE}
StatusType ∈ {NORMAL,GET,GRANT, TRY GET,GRANTGET,EXECUTE}
Structures:
AgentState = (ta, x, v, a); // timestamp, position, velocity, acceleration
Agent = (aID, AS); // agent ID, AgentState structure
AgentTag = (ts, aID, turn); // timestamp, agent ID, intended turn
Membership = (tm,MO,SM); // timestamp, MO flag, SM set of agent IDs
Message = (senderID, t, type, (data)); // agent ID,timestamp,message type,message data
Constants:
aID: a hard-coded agent identifier
Variables:
AR← ∅ ; // Agent registry
MR← ∅; // Membership registry, set of Memberships
status← NORMAL
tag ← ⊥; // Unique tag for each manoeuvre
grantID ← ⊥; // ID of the agent with an active GRANT
M← ∅; // Set of received messages
D ← ∅; // Set of destination agent IDs
R ← ∅; // Set of expected response agent IDs
tRETRY; // Timer for keeping track of when to next try starting a new request round
Interfaces:
clock(): read current time
position(): read current agent position
velocity(): read current agent velocity
acceleration(): read current agent acceleration
startTimer(timer, delay): start named timer for delay time units
stopTimer(timer): stop named timer
storeAR(AR): write an AR registry to the storage service
getMR(aID): read from the storage service the MR for agent aID
doManoeuvre: execute the manoeuvre by setting the intention to go
noPriorityViolationDynamic(AR, turn): check if the agent specified in AR have sufficient time to cross the
intersection without violating the priority of the ego vehicle, see Section 3.2.5
last(): returns True if R∩D ∩MR.SM = ∅, False otherwise
myPriority(m): returns True if paID has an on going request and that request has the priority over the request
of message m, eg having an earlier time stamp, or if equal, lower agent ID.
hasLeftCriticalSection(aID): returns True when the agent paID’s location is known to be outside the bound-
aries and heading out from the intersection.
ntfyEstimat(grant, aID/revoke): Notify the risk estimator about priority changes of either a grant of agent
aID or the revoke of a grant
Figure 5.1: Structures, variables and interfaces for the manoeuvre negotiation protocol
use of MO thereby provides a way to both reduce the number of sent messages – since vehicles will not send
a request if MO = false – and a way to indicate if an empty membership is valid.
Finally, all memberships in the membership set are stored on the storage server accessible by all agents (line
31).
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Algorithm 3: The Manoeuvre Negotiation protocol
1 do forever (once in every TA time units) begin
2 AR← (aID, (clock(), position(), velocity(), acceleration())) ;
3 storeAR(AR);
4 MR← getMR(aID) ;
5 M← {m ∈M : m.senderID ∈ (D ∩MR.SM)};
6 if status = GET ∧ last() then // All expected answers received
7 stopTimer(tRETRY); // No need for a retry
8 if @m ∈M : m.type = DENY then status← EXECUTE; ntfyEstimat(grant) ;
9 else {status← TRY GET ; multicast 〈aID, clock(), RELEASE, (AR, tag)〉 to D; startTimer(tRETRY, TA);};
10 if status = EXECUTE ∧ hasLeftCriticalSection(aID,MR.SM) then
11 multicast 〈aID, clock(), RELEASE, (AR, tag)〉 to D; // Explicit release
12 status← NORMAL; ntfyEstimat(revoke);
13 if status ∈ GRANT,GRANTGET ∧ hasLeftCriticalSection(grantID,MR.SM) then
14 ntfyEstimat(revoke); grantID ← ⊥;
15 if status = GRANTGET then status← TRY GET ; tryManoeuvre(tag.turn);
16 else if status = GRANT then status← NORMAL;
17 procedure tryManoeuvre(turn) begin
18 if status ∈ {NORMAL,GRANT} then tag ← (clock(), aID, turn) ;
19 if status ∈ {NORMAL, TRY GET} then
20 let ts = clock();
21 (status,AR,MR)← (TRY GET, (aID, (ts, position(), velocity(), acceleration()), getMR(aID)[turn]);
22 if (ts < MR.tm+ 2TM ∧MR.MO) then
23 (M,D,R, status)← (⊥,MR.SM,MR.SM, GET );
24 multicast 〈aID, ts,GET, (AR, tag)〉 to D;
25 startTimer(tRETRY, 2TD);
26 else startTimer(tRETRY, TA);
27 else if status = GRANT then status← GRANTGET ;
28 upon timer tRETRY expires begin
29 if status = GET then
30 status← TRY GET ; multicast 〈aID, clock(), RELEASE, (AR, tag)〉 to D; startTimer(tRETRY, 2TD);
31 tryManoeuvre(tag.turn);
32 upon message m received at time tr begin
33 if tr −m.t ≤ TD then // Message is timely
34 if m.type ∈ {GRANT,DENY } ∧ status = GET then (M,R)← (M∪ {m},R \ {m.AR.aID}) ;
35 else if m.type = GET then
36 if noPriorityViolationDynamic(requestee,m.AR) ∧ (status ∈ {NORMAL, TRY GET} ∨ (status ∈
{GRANT,GRANTGET} ∧ grantID = m.AR.aID) ∨ (status = GET ∧ ¬myPriority(m))) then
37 if status = NORMAL then (status, grantID)← (GRANT,m.AR.aID);
38 else if status ∈ {GET, TRY GET} then
39 stopTimer(tRETRY);
40 if status = GET then multicast 〈aID, clock(), RELEASE, (AR, tag)〉 to D ;
41 (status, grantID)← (GRANTGET,m.AR.aID);
42 ntfyEstimat(grant,m.AR.aID); send 〈aID, tr,GRANT,⊥〉 to m.AR.aID ;
43 else send 〈aID, tr,DENY,⊥〉 to m.AR.aID ;
44 else if m.type = RELEASE ∧ status ∈ {GRANT,GRANTGET} ∧ grantID = m.AR.aID then
45 ntfyEstimat(revoke); grantID ← ⊥ ;
46 if status = GRANT then status← NORMAL;
47 if status = GRANTGET then status← TRY GET ; tryManoeuvre(tag.turn) ;
5.1.2 Description of the Manoeuvre Negotiation Algorithm
TheManoeuvre Negotiation Algorithm (Algorithm 3) consists of four main components: the core state-
update procedure that is called periodically (lines 1 to 12), a procedure that is called when an agent seeks
permission to perform a manoeuvre (lines 17 to 27), a timer-triggered procedure used to ensure algorithm
progression in the event of network failures (lines 28 to 31), and a message processing procedure(lines 32 to
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The state-update procedure itself has four main parts, the first of which handles communication with
the storage server. Every vehicle in our system measures their current position, heading, velocity, and
acceleration every TA time units (line 2) and then stores that information on the storage server (line 3).
This vehicle information is used by the membership service to calculate memberships in Algorithm 2. Every
vehicle also fetches the latest version of their membership set from the storage server and stores it locally
(line 4).
The second part of the procedure determines if a vehicle that is requesting a permission to perform a
manoeuvre – a requester – has been fully granted. Replies from vehicles that are not a part of the intersection
between the membership that was valid when the request was initiated (D) and the current membership
(MR.SM) are filtered out from the set of received repliesM (line 5). Vehicles that in D but not MR.SM
must have already left the intersection, so their replies are considered irrelevant. Vehicles that are inMR.SM
but not D are considered too far away to have any impact on the requested manoeuvre. Vehicles in neither
set are also either too far away, or have at most equal priority to the requester and therefore should not be
allowed to affect the decision process.
Next, the requesters – having the status GET – confirm that all expected replies to the sent request have
arrived by calling last() (line 6). If all expected replies have arrived then the tRETRY is stopped to mark the
end of the current request round (line 7). In order to assess if the requester is fully granted,M is searched
for any DENY replies and, if none are found, the requester changes status to EXECUTE and is thereby
free to enter the intersection (line 8). Otherwise the requester will send a RELEASE message to all vehicles
in D telling them to stop considering the requester granted and the tRETRY timer will be started again to
continue the request into a new round (line 9).
The third part of the procedure determines when a fully granted vehicle should release its grant. A fully
granted agent pi – having status EXECUTE – will use their measured position and knowledge regarding
the intersection’s geometry to determine if it has left the intersection (line 10) and should therefore send a
〈RELEASE〉 of the grant to every vehicle in D (line 10). The agent pi will then return to status NORMAL
and call ntfyEstimat(revoke) to also inform the RE about the revoked grant (line 12).
The last part of the state-update procedure handles implicit release of a grant which enables a grant to be
released even when the explicit release message is lost. An agent that is currently granting another agent,
having status GRANT or GRANTGET , checks if the latest measured position of the granted agent lies
outside and is heading away from the intersection (line 13). If the condition is True then the agent notifies the
RE about the priority change by calling ntfyEstimat(revoke) and clears grantID (14). An agent previously
prevented from starting a request round, denoted by having status GRANTGET , takes on status TRY GET
and calls tryManoeuvre to try to start a new request round (line 15). An agent with status GRANT instead
goes back to status NORMAL (line 16).
The request initiating procedure tryManoeuvre is invoked when starting a new round of a requests. During
the first round of a request, where the vehicle has status NORMAL or GRANT , the procedure generates
an identification tag for the request, then stores: the time stamp of when the first request round started, the
ID of the requester, and the manoeuvre the requester wants to perform (line 18). Requesters that are not
currently granting another agent, having status NORMAL or TRY GET , proceed to measure their current
agent state and fetch the latest membership from the storage server (line 21).
Starting a request round further requires a valid membership, implying that the membership is based on data
no older than 2TM time units and with a MO = true (line 22). If the membership is valid, then the state
variablesM, D, and R will be assigned the values ⊥, MR.SM, and MR.SM respectively, where R is the
set of agents that are expected to reply and the status is changed to GET (line 23). A 〈GET 〉 request is then
sent to all agents in D along with the request tag. The tRETRY timer is set to 2TD to limit the duration of
the request round (line 25). An agent without a valid membership will wait for a new membership from the
membership server by starting the tRETRY timer and try starting a request round at a later point in time
26. A potential requester that is currently granting another agent, having status GRANT , is not allowed
to start a request round until the grant is released, but a status change to GRANTGET is made to signify
that the agent wants to send out a request later when it is allowed (line 27).
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Upon expiry of the tRETRY timer, an agent currently in a request round, having status GET , will end it
by sending a RELEASE to all agents in D, changing its status to TRY GET and starting the tRETRY
timer again (line 30 and 30). The agent did not get all expected replies in the set time frame and must
therefore stop the current round to avoid deadlocks. If the timer expires for an agent without an ongoing
request round, having status TRY GET , then the agent will try to start a new request round by calling the
tryManoeuvre procedure (line 31).
The final part of the Manoeuvre Negotiating algorithm determines how incoming messages are processed
depending on the agent’s current status and the agent state of the sender. Messages sent more than TD time
units ago are discarded in order to avoid messages from previous request rounds interfering with the current
round (line 33).
The first type of messages that are processed are request replies on the form
〈GRANT 〉 and 〈DENY 〉. Any requester will store these messages in the setM and remove the sender ID
from the set of agents whose expected responses have not yet arrived, R, (line 34).
The second message type that is processed is 〈GET 〉 which symbolises a permission request (line 35). The
receivers have to decide if the request should be granted or denied. Firstly, a call to noPriorityViolation
determines if the sender can, while following normal driving patterns, cross the intersection without blocking
the receiver (line 36). In addition to the non-blocking criteria, the receiver has to check its own status to see
if it allows the agent to grant the sender.
Status NORMAL and TRY GET imply that the agent does not have an active request round and is therefore
allowed to grant another agent (line 36).
Agents with status GRANT or GRANTGET are currently holding a grant for another agent. If this is the
same agent as the sender then the receiver is allowed to reply with a 〈GRANT 〉 (line 36).
The last status that allows the receiver to reply with a grant occurs where the receiver both has status
GET – meaning that it has an active request round – and the sender has higher priority than the receiver –
determined by a call to the interface myPriority (line 36). The interface myPriority will return False if either
the sender’s request was started before the receiver’s request or if they were started concurrently and the
sender’s ID is lower than the receiver’s.
A receiver fulfilling both the non-blocking and status criteria will store the ID of the granted agent if it has
not yet done so, and change its status to either GRANT – if it has status NORMAL – or to GRANTGET
– if it has status GET or TRY GET (lines 37, 38, and 41). Changing from status GET or TRY GET to
GRANTGET also implies both that the tRETRY timer has to be stopped and that any ongoing round must
be stopped by sending a 〈RELEASE〉 to all agents in D, since an agent in GRANTGET is not allowed
to either start or have an ongoing request round (lines 39 and 40). The risk estimator is then notified with
ntfyEstimat(grant) that the priorities have changed and a 〈GRANT 〉 reply is sent to the request sender (line
42). If these criteria are not fulfilled, a 〈DENY 〉 is sent in reply (line 43).
The last type of messages to be processed are 〈RELEASE〉 messages. An agent with status GRANT or
GRANTGET that receives a release message from the holder of the grant will call ntfyEstimat(revoke) to
inform the risk estimator of the expiry of the granted vehicle’s higher priority (45). A GRANT agent will
return to status NORMAL while a GRANTGET agent switches to status TRY GET and calls tryManoeuvre
in order to try to start a request round (line 46 to 47).
5.2 Correctness Proof
By the stature of Algorithm 3, we can observe the correctness of Corollary 5.1.
Corollary 5.1 Let E be an execution of the proposed solution. At any system state, it holds that (status ∈
{TRY GET} =⇒ active(tRETRY)), where active(t) is a predicate that represents the fact that timer
t has been started (by the function startTimer(t)), and has not stopped (by the function stopTimer(t)) or
expired without triggering the event bounded to timer t. Furthermore, an active tRETRY timer expires
within B_RETRY = max{2TD, TA} time units.
Lemma 5.2 (Membership) Let E be a synchronous execution of algorithms 2 and 3. Requirement 4.1
holds throughout E.
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Proof. To prove that Requirement 4.1 holds throughout E it needs to be shown that a fresh membership
M of an agent pi with MO = True contains all agents that could potentially cause a priority violation with
pi from the current time T until T + 2TD +TMAN . We say that a membership is valid if this property holds
for the membership. We refer to all other memberships as non-valid. It needs to be proven that, when t is
the timestamp bound to M (line 29), M can only be non-valid if MO = False or M is no longer fresh, i.e.,
t ≥ T − 2TM .
Algorithm 2 (lines 21 to 31) defines the procedure in which memberships are created and stored. We review
this procedure and show its key properties.
Algorithm 2 considers all potential priority violations. The procedure calls
noPriorityViolationStrict(t + 2TM + 2TD + TMAN ) to determine all agents U that have higher priority than
pi and that could potentially reach the intersection at some point from t to t + 2TM + 2TD + TMan (line
26). These agents U are the ones that could potentially lead to a priority violation with pi according to our
definition in Section 3.2.3.
Algorithm 2 assigns correct MO values. For a given turn, the membership M is assigned the set U [turn]
if, and only if, MO is assigned the value True, otherwise M is assigned the empty set (line 30). The variable
MO thereby distinguishes a valid empty membership set from a non-valid empty membership set.
Algorithm 2 assigns correct time stamps. The time stamp associated with a membership is assigned the
value of the earliest time stamp tmin of the agents in U [turn] (line 29). This implies that a fresh membership
is valid from T to T + 2TD + 2TM + TMAN − (T − tmin) where T − tmin ≤ 2TM due to the freshness of M .
This proves Requirement 4.1 since we assume that vehicles do not drive backwards on highways. 
Theorem 5.3 (Safety) Let E be an execution of algorithms 2 and 3 that is not necessarily synchronous in
which Requirement 4.3 holds throughout. Requirements 4.2, 4.3, and 4.5 hold throughout E.
Proof.
1. Requirement 4.2: By the structure of Algorithm 3, we can observe that an agent pi that aims to
perform a manoeuvre, has to call tryManoeuvre() (line 17) and be granted a permission before reaching
the status EXECUTE. In detail, tryManoeuvre() is the only interface procedure for agent pi, which
includes lines 23 to 25 in which requests are sent. By line 22, we see that pi sends such a request only
when (i) its membership is fresh and (ii) there is an positive indication for a manoeuvre opportunity.
Otherwise, pi checks conditions (i) to (iii) after TA time units (line 26). Thus, Requirement 4.2 is
fulfilled.
2. Requirement 4.3:
Algorithm 3 defines how a 〈GET 〉 message is sent (lines 22 to 25) and received (line 35 to 43). We note
that pi sends a 〈GET 〉 message only if the if-statement condition at line 36, i.e., (ti < M.tm+ 2TM ∧
MR.MO) which implies that the first assumption of Requirement 4.3 holds. To show that the second
assumption holds, we note that pj processes a request message 〈GET 〉 from pi at a time tj ∈ [ti, ti+TD]
only when its delivery is timely (line 33). Thus, we only need to prove that a request sent by a requester
pi at a time ti to a requestee pj in pi’s membership M is replied to with a 〈GRANT 〉 if, and only if,
at a time tj ∈ [ti, ti +TD] when the request is delivered to pj , noPriorityViolationDynamic(ARj) = True
and pj is in one of the states presented in the cases (i) to (iii) described in Requirement 4.3.
From line 36 we observe that noPriorityViolationDynamic(ARj) = True is a mandatory condition for
a request to be granted. From line 36, we can also observe that if (a) pj has status NORMAL or
TRY GET , (b) pj ’s status is GRANT and the granted agent is pi, or (c) pj ’s status is GET and pi
has higher priority according to myPriority, then pj will send a 〈GRANT 〉 and call ntfyEstimat(grant)
(line 42). Moreover, pj reply with a 〈DENY 〉 if pj is in a state different from cases (a) to (c) or if
noPriorityViolationDynamic() = False (line 43). The cases (a) to (c) indeed correspond to (i) to (iii),
which Requirement 4.3 defines. Since the lines 42 and 43 are the only locations in the algorithm where
a 〈GRANT 〉 or 〈DENY 〉 is sent, Requirement 4.3 is satisfied.
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3. Requirement 4.4:
From Algorithm 3 we see that a 〈RELEASE〉 message is sent to all agents in D only on the lines 9,
30, 12, and 45. We need to show that these lines are reached if, and only if, any of the cases (i) to (iv)
presented in Requirement 4.4 hold. We further need to show that ntfyEstimat(revoke) is only called
when an agent pj receives a 〈RELEASE〉 from another agent pi and pj is currently holding a grant
for pi or when pj is in state EXECUTE and has left the intersection.
To reach and execute line 9, the requesting agent pi (with status GET ) needs to receive replies before
the time T = ti + 2TD − TA, where ti is the time when pi’s request was sent, otherwise the tRETRY
timer will expire before the if-state condition on line 6 evaluates to True. The agent pi’s tRETRY timer
will be stopped immediately after pi discover that all needed replies have arrived to stop the timer from
interfering (line 7). Furthermore, any received 〈DENY 〉 message before time T from another agent pj
will be stored by pi (line 34). However, pj ’s 〈DENY 〉 will only be kept if pj ∈ (D ∩M), where M is
pi’s current membership (line 5). The agent pi will then execute line 9 since pj ’s 〈DENY 〉 ∈ M (line
8). This case correspond exactly to case (i).
If not all messages arrive before time T , then the tRETRY timer set by pi when sending the request
(line 25) expires and pi will execute line 28. The agent pi will then reach and execute line 30 since pi
has status GET . This corresponds to case (ii). An agent cannot reach line 30 in any other way since
all other cases in which pi starts the tRETRY timer (lines 9, 26, and 30) the agent will have status
TRY GET .
To execute line 12, agent pi’s status has to be EXECUTE and pi has to have left the intersection so
that hasLeftCriticalSection(pi,M) evaluates to True (line 10). This correspond to case (iii).
The last line in which a 〈RELEASE〉 can be sent, line 45, can be reached only if an agent pi has
status GET when receiving a 〈GET 〉 message m from another agent pj and if ¬myPriority(m) = True,
and noPriorityViolationDynamic(ARj) = True (lines 35, 36, 38, and 40). This corresponds to case (iv).
We consider the case in which agent pj has the status GRANT and holding a grant for pi while
receiving a 〈RELEASE〉 message from pi. In this case, pj calls ntfyEstimat(revoke) (line 12). The
only other line where
ntfyEstimat(revoke) is called is line 14. This line can only be reached if an agent has status EXECUTE
and if hasLeftCriticalSection(aID) evaluates to True (line 10). Requirement 4.4 is thus satisfied.
4. Requirement 4.5: Note that pi does not remove messages that are needed (such as in line 5). By
line 6 to 9 and the definition of the function last() in Figure 5.1, agent pi does not change its status
to EXECUTE before it receives all the needed responses. This change to EXECUTE depends on
the absence of a response that includes a 〈DENY 〉, i.e., the case of being fully-granted. Otherwise,
pi changes status to TRY GET , sends a release message to all agents in D and restarts the request
process after TA time units.

Theorem 5.4 (Progression) Let E be a synchronous execution of algorithms 2 and 3 in which admissible
crossing opportunities occur infinitely often (for every direction of the intersection). Requirement 4.6 holds
throughout E.
Proof. Let pi be an agent that is the closest to the intersection from its direction and that aims at crossing
the intersection, i.e., it calls tryManoeuvre() (line 17). By lines 21 and 27, immediately after the execution
of tryManoeuvre(), the state of pi cannot be in {NORMAL,GRANT}. This proof shows that the states
GET , TRY GET , and GRANTGET must lead to EXECUTE before returning to the state NORMAL by
demonstrating that pi indeed reaches the status EXECUTE and crosses the intersection.
Without loss of generality, suppose that E is an execution in which pi’s status is not in {NORMAL,
GRANT} during the first system state of E. Moreover, suppose that immediately after E’s starting system
state, we have a period of Tadmissible > B_RETRY + 2TA time units in which pi has an admissible crossing
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opportunity, where B_RETRY = max{2TD, TA}. Generality is not lost due to the statement in the
beginning of this proof and because Requirement 4.6’s assumptions, which means that an admissible crossing
opportunity for pi always occurs eventually (within a finite period).
The rest of the proof considers pi’s status in E’s starting system state, which can be one of GET , TRY GET ,
and GRANTGET , and shows that it indeed reaches status EXECUTE.
• Suppose that statusi = GET. Note that the do forever loop (line 1) of Algorithm 3 starts a
new iteration once in every TA time units. Therefore, within TA time units, agent pi executes line 6.
Once that occurs, the if-statement condition in line 6 holds, due to the assumption of this case that
the status of pi is = GET , the definition of the function last() (Figure 5.1) and the assumption that
during the first Tadmissible time units of E it holds that pi has an admissible crossing opportunity, i.e.,
MRi.SM = ∅ and MRi.SM is fresh.
Note that the removal of stale information in line 5 implies that @m ∈M : m.type = DENY holds.
This means that the if-statement condition in line 8 holds and pi gets status EXECUTE. Thus, the
proof is done for this case, because Tadmissible > 2TA.
• Suppose that statusi = TRYGET. By Corollary 5.1, it holds that status = TRY GET im-
plies that the timer tRETRY is active. Thus, within B_RETRY = max{2TD, TA} time units agent
pi executes the procedure associated with this timer expiration (line 28), which calls the procedure
tryManoeuvre(tag.turn) (line 31). During the execution of the procedure (line 17), it holds that the
if-statement condition in line 19 holds (due to this case’s assumption that status = TRY GET ). By
the assumption that during the first Tadmissible time units there is an admissible crossing opportunity
in E with respect to agent pi, it holds that the if-statement condition in line 22 evaluates to True. Once
that happens, line 23 assigns GET to statusi before setting the timer tRETRY to a value larger than
2TA (line 25). Thus, pi start and completes the execution of the do forever loop (line 1 to 12) with
statusi = GET before the expiration of the timer tRETRY (line 28). The proof is thereby done for
this case by arguments similar to the case of statusi = GET , since Tadmissible > B_RETRY + 2TA.
• Suppose that statusi = GRANTGET. By the definition of an admissible crossing opportunity,
pi’s membership will be empty for at least Tadmissible > B_RETRY + 2TA time units. An empty
membership implies that no other agents can cause a priority violation with pi, which in turn implies
that the agent pj that pi is granting must have left the intersection. Within TA time units, pi evaluates
the if-statement in line 13 to True, revokes the held grant, changes status to TRY GET , and calls
tryManoeuvre (line 14 to 15). The rest of the proof is identical to the latter part of the TRY GET case
above.

6 Implementation
6.1 The Risk Estimator
The Risk Estimator (RE) used in the simulations is based on [11], and was modified in order to utilise
speed models – as opposed to constant speed – when making vehicle motion predictions.
The RE represents every vehicle in the traffic scene with a particle filter. Each particle filter has weighted
particles, where each particle has a position, heading, speed, manoeuvre intention, and expectation and
intention to go or stop, representing the state of the vehicle. These particles are projected one time step
forward in time based on their current state vector using simple motion formulas (position, heading, speed)
and a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) (Expectation and Intentions). New weights are then assigned to the
particles based on their similarity to the last received AS from the respective vehicle. A multivariate normal
distribution is used as a likelihood function to measure similarity and the measured entities are assumed to
be independent.
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After the batch of particles for every vehicle have been projected and re-weighted, the risk estimator then
estimates the new expectations. Expectation is based on the traffic priority rules and time gaps of when
the vehicles are estimated to enter the intersection, we refer to this time as Time To Entry (TTE). Speed
models for every manoeuvre and intention to go or stop are used to estimate TTEs. For non-priority vehicles,
the difference between the TTE for each vehicle is fed into a gap model, which determines if the gap is large
enough for the vehicle to be expected to go, or whether it will be required to stop and wait for higher priority
vehicles. The cumulative distribution function for the gap model is presented in Equation (6.1),
Y = 11 + eb(a−x) . (6.1)
where the constants a and b can be adjusted to change the threshold position and steepness of which time
gaps are considered big enough with a high likelihood. Priority vehicles will have the expectation to go.
As mentioned previously, the manoeuvre intention and intention to go or stop is determined by a HMM, see
Figure 6.1. The HMM is designed let a vehicle change the manoeuvre intention with a probability of 10%
in every time step, representing the fact that most drivers keep to their manoeuvre plan. Drivers are also
modelled as usually adhering to the expectations, with a chance of 90% to comply if the current expectation
matches the previous intention and a chance of 50% if they do not match.
I = go I = stop
E = stop|0.5
E = go|0.1
E = go|0.5
E = stop|0.1
Figure 6.1: Visual representation of the HMM for the intention to go or stop. The transitions, labelled
a|b, represent the likelihood b of changing to the other value if the expectation is calculated to be a.
In the beginning of a new round of estimations, re-sampling will occur if there are too few particles with
a high enough weight. Particles with a weight under a certain threshold will then be discarded and more
likely particles will be duplicated. This process is called importance sampling and is used to reduce the risk
of sample depletion when almost all particles have negligible weights, while still minimising the amount of
lost information [8]. If all weights equal 0 after an estimation round, the particle filter is restarted with new
particles spread around the latest received agent state.
Finally, the risk is computed for a vehicle by computing the sum of the normalised weights of the particles
representing it where the intention is go but the expectation is to stop. A sum higher than the set risk
threshold triggers an emergency break (EB) in which the vehicle sets its intention to stop.
Having an intention to stop but expectation to go may also be considered risky when multiple vehicles are
driving in a line but we decided to not include it in our calculations at this stage since we are studying
collisions caused by vehicles coming from different directions.
6.2 Internal hierarchy for deciding vehicle intention
Both the Manoeuvre Negotiation protocol and the Risk Estimator influence a vehicle’s intention to go or
stop. According to the Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol, all vehicles should have the intention to stop until
they are fully granted. The Risk Estimator, on the other hand, sets a vehicle’s intention based on a gap model
to calculate the expectation and a HMM to, based on the previous intention and the current expectation,
calculate the intention. The Risk Estimator also calculates a risk of a vehicle’s intention not matching the
expectation and triggers an emergency break if this risk passes a set threshold. Emergency break in this case
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is the same as setting the intention to stop. In addition to our safety system, traffic rules can also be used
to set a vehicles intention. There are therefore 4 possible sources of information a vehicle can use to set its
intention and setting up an internal hierarchy between them is necessary to avoid a arbitrary behaviour.
The hierarchical order we decided upon with the most influential indicator first is
1. Emergency break
2. Priorities set by the Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol
3. Risk Estimator’s HMM
4. Priorities determined by traffic rules
An emergency break will set the intention of a vehicle to stop no matter what the other system’s say. If
no emergency break is triggered then the priorities set by the Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol decide if a
vehicle should go or stop. Lastly, if no emergency break is triggered and the manoeuvre negotiation protocol
is not in use, the output from the HMM decides the intention of a vehicle.
If none of our safety systems are active then the traffic rules themselves can be used to set the intention.
The traffic rules are placed last on the list but they influence the decisions made by both the Risk Estimator
and the Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol.
6.3 Architecture
The architecture setup can be found in Figure 6.2. An intersection traffic scenario, a membership service
and two cars – each following the manoeuvre negotiation protocol and having their own risk estimator –
were simulated using ROS. A storage server for vehicle state data and memberships was implemented as an
Apache Zookeeper server.
6.3.1 Storage server
The manoeuvre negotiation protocol relies on a storage server where agents regularly upload their current
state and read their memberships computed by a membership service, here referred to as the cloud. In
our implementation, this storage server was chosen to be an Apache Zookeeper server because it provides a
framework for building a highly reliable and distributed server. Communication to the server was done via
TCP.
The Zookeeper server has 2 main directories (called znodes): segment and mr. Segment stores the agent
states (time stamp, position, heading, speed) that all vehicles regularly update and that the cloud uses
to compute memberships. The memberships come in sets, with one membership per possible manoeuvre
through the intersection. Each membership is stored in mr under the ID for every vehicle and has the form
(Turn, Manoeuvre opportunity, Safety membership)viii.
The vehicles periodically write their current state to the storage server and read their own membership set,
whilst the cloud in turn reads the agents’ agent states and then writes their computed memberships to the
server (see Figure 6.2).
6.3.2 Simulation environment
Every vehicle is represented by a ROS node in the simulation environment and the vehicles publish their
Agent State (AS) every TA time units to their own ROS topic (a publish-subscribe communication channel
in ROS). The vehicles subscribe to other vehicle’s topics and use the received states as inputs to their risk
estimator. Every vehicle further sends their AS and retrieves their membership set from the storage server
over TCP. The messages sent in the manoeuvre negotiation protocol uses UDP since the protocol itself is
designed to handle packet loss and a much delayed (possibly retransmitted) packets are discarded in the
protocol anyway.
viiiSee Section 5.1.1 for a more detailed explanation of the parts of a membership
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Figure 6.2: A high-level map of the simulation environment. One or two-headed arrows designate com-
munication channels that are mono-respective bi-directional. Both the vehicles and the cloud were set up
in ROS while a Zookeeper server was used as an external storage server. The environment block represents
information regarding the geometry of the intersection.
The membership service is also implemented on a ROS node. It reads all the agent states (AR) from the
segment znode on the storage server and then writes all the computed memberships (MR) to another znode,
mr, on the same storage server. The memberships are computed using the ASs and intersection information,
which includes the priorities and geometry set up at when the simulation was initiated.
6.3.3 The Risk Estimator
Every simulated vehicle was equipped with a Risk Estimator. The risk estimator chosen was based on one
developed by by [11] but which some modificationsix. The risk estimator was run as a background process
throughout the simulation, as explained in further detail in Section 3.4.3. Each particle filter used by the
RE was set to have 625 weighted particles representing the state of a vehicle.
6.3.4 The Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol
Every vehicle node in ROS was equipped with an object to handle the Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol in
Algorithm 3. Another node, the Cloud, was dedicated to running the Membership Algorithm in Algorithm
2 in which memberships for every vehicle in the traffic scene are computed.
More details on the Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol are provided as line by line descriptions in Section 5.1;
a correctness proof is given in Section 5.2.
7 Evaluation
This chapter describes the different test scenarios, evaluation criteria and how tests were compared to
validate our implementation of the risk estimator and the manoeuvre negotiation algorithm. Tests were also
ixsee Section 6.1
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conducted to show liveliness of the updated protocol.
7.1 Simulation environment
A 4-way intersection was set up in ROS with predefined paths for every incoming directions’ manoeuvres,
corresponding to turning left or right or going straight. The north-south lanes were given higher priority
in respect to the crossing east-west lanes. The simulated vehicles were implemented on ROS nodes. A
speed model decided the vehicles’ speed depending on their distance from the intersection, see Figure 3.3.
A PID-controller adjusted the steering angle to keep the vehicles on the paths. The vehicles exchanged
state information with added Gaussian noise every 0.5 s using ROS-topics. The manoeuvre negotiation was
conducted using UDP while the communication with the storage server used TCP. Every vehicle had their
own instance of a risk estimator and manoeuvre negotiator.
7.1.1 Simulation scenario
A great percentage of all traffic accidents with serious or fatal outcomes occur in intersections. Of all
the possible turns through intersections, left-turn-across-path is considered one of the most collision-prone
which is why we have decided to focus on this manoeuvre in our tests. The simulations involve two vehicles
approaching an unsignaled intersection from opposite directions, where one vehicle intends to do a left
turn, VL, while the other intends to go straight, VH , see Figure 7.1. Both vehicles are on the priority lane
but they do not have equal priority in the intersection since intending to doing a left turn initially decreases
a vehicle’s priority. The test cases will therefore involve VL requesting permission from VH to change the
priorities.
Figure 7.1: The scenario of a vehicle, VL, turning left across the priority lane with an opposing priority
vehicle, VH , approaching, used for testing our system.
7.1.2 System comparisons
To evaluate our contribution to the Manoeuvre Negotiation protocol we want to compare its performance to
tests conducted with the risk estimator alone and with the two systems combined. These tests are needed to
check if the combined system performs better than any of the systems by itself. Values that will be compared
are explained further in Section 7.2. Reference values without emergency break and manoeuvre negotiation
were calculated from the starting position in every case instead of simulating their runs since these vehicles
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deterministically following the speed model without stopping. The following setups were tested for every
test case
• RE: Running the risk estimator alone with the emergency break feature on
• MN: Using the Manoeuvre Negotiation protocol alone, no emergency break
• RE+MN: Running the risk estimator with emergency break and the Manoeuvre Negotiator
Each of these setups were run with the same list of seeds for the random number generator to give the runs
the same initial conditions. The seed affects the risk estimator – which uses random numbers in the particle
filter – and the manoeuvre negotiation, which depends on a random function when a received request is
processed. Every test case was run 10 times with 2 different seeds each time (one for each of the two libraries
of random functions used). The quantitative evaluation criteria were computed by taking a mean of the 10
values with the highest and lowest value removed. The qualitative criteria were calculated as a mean over
all 10 values, which results in a number between 0 to 1 indicating how likely an event is when certain start
values are deployed.
7.2 Evaluation criteria
The tests were evaluated based on criteria that measure the:
• Number of collisions and dangerous situations. A collision is here defined as a case where the vehicles
both occupy the space shared by both their paths and a situation is defined as dangerous if the
distance separating the front of each vehicle is less than 4m. Saved state data from the simulations
was used to calculate these values.
• Time Lost due to Priority Violations (TLPV). TLPV is only computed for the initially higher
priority vehicle VH and will be positive that vehicle has to slow down due to the actions of the other
(lower priority) vehicle VL. This would occur when, for example, either the emergency break is triggered
or if the other vehicle is both granted and then releases the grant later than expected. TLPV is a
qualitative measure of the implementation of noPriorityViolation. Time to enter the intersection for
each of the test cases were compared with a computed optimal value from a scenario where the priority
vehicle does not have to interact with any other vehicle.
• Number of emergency breaks triggered by the risk estimator. The outcomes from the RE test case are
used here to determine whether or not adding the Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol will cause the risk
estimator to give false alarms.
• Time To get fully Granted (TTG) after the initial request was sent. This measure was recorded to
demonstrate liveliness of the Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol. It also provides a measure of through-
put.
Emergency breaks and TLPV can both be signs of priority violations for the higher priority vehicle, caused
by the risk estimator and Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol separately. An emergency break signal will occur
if the risk estimator computes that the lower priority vehicle is about to drive through the intersection before
the higher priority vehicle when the time gap is considered too small. TLPV instead measures how much
the priority vehicle is slowed down by having to break in order to let the granted lower priority vehicle finish
its manoeuvre. It is therefore a measure of how well the manoeuvre negotiation protocol approximated the
time of the manoeuvre execution for the lower priority vehicle.
To measure the performance of our implementation of the risk estimator we further conducted some tests
measuring the:
• Time To Collision Point (TTCP) when the risk estimator first triggered an emergency break. This
provides a measure of how early the risk estimator was able to detect a possible collision. The TTCP
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was computed using the vehicle’s position in combination with the speed model shown in Figure 3.3,
which produced an estimate as to when the vehicle would first reach the collision zone (at the collision
point). The collision zone is the part of the two vehicles’ trajectories that overlap when also considering
the size of the vehicles.
• Precision, which determines if the risk estimator is prone to producing a large number of false alarms.
Precision is here defined as the number of test cases where an actual dangerous situation was detected,
divided by the total number of the cases where the emergency break was triggered.
• Recall, which measures how well the risk estimation is able to detect potential collisions. Recall is here
defined as the number of test cases where an emergency break was triggered in a dangerous situation
divided by the total number of test cases where a dangerous situation occurred.
Observe that TTCP is defined to be a non-negative measure, because any instance where an EB event is
triggered and the vehicle is either in the collision zone of has left the collision zone are assigned a TTCP
value of 0, since at that point the vehicle has either reached or passed the collision point. It follows that any
EB events after this point cannot help in preventing a collision.
7.3 Test Cases
The distance parameters used during the simulation are all measured from the centre of the intersection, see
Figure 7.2. The start distance for VL, d0, and the request initiation distance, dInit, were kept fixed to 65m
and 30m respectively. The start distance for VH , d1, was varied x.
Figure 7.2: Distance parameters used during the simulations. All distances are measured from the middle
of the intersection and all except d1 are fixed. The values for dCLX can be found in Table 7.1, dInit = 30m,
d0 = 65m and the values for d1 are described in 7.3.
Each test case focused on varying one parameter while keeping the others fixed or, as in the cases with added
noise or communication loss, limited to a few values in order to try to determine how varying the parameter
affects the results. Here follows a presentation on the different test cases and a motivation as to why they
where chosen to evaluate our implementation. The letter combination used to refer to each test case is set
between parenthesis in the test case’s title.
xsee Section 7.3.1 for more details
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7.3.1 Test Case: Normal (Normal)
Variations in starting distance result in different time gaps of when the two vehicles are estimated to enter
the intersection and should therefore affect everything that is related to our risk estimation. The start
distance d1 for VH was therefore varied in steps of 4m between 125 to 13m, measured from the centre of
the intersection. The other vehicle’s start distance d0 was kept constant.
7.3.2 Test Case: Noisy Measurements (Noise)
Noise in various levels is always present in real-life measurements. It is therefore of great importance to test
how our implementation performs under variously noisy conditions.
In this test case, extra noise was added to the measured agent state values including speed, position and
angle before using the values in the system. Since the noise added in the Normal case in Section 7.3.1 was
Gaussian with a true mean and standard deviation of σ, we decided to add two test cases here, one with a
standard deviation for the noise of 1.5σ and the other of 2σ. For each of these two settings, the different
start position runs as described in Section 7.3.1 were performed.
7.3.3 Test Case: Lost communication (ComLoss)
Message loss is also a common fault that occurs in real systems. To simulate message loss in our simulation
we added a total lack of communication for VL at 3 different distances from the intersection dCL0, dCL1, and
dCL2, for 3 different time durations tCL0, tCL1, and tCL2. Their values can be found in Table 7.1 and the
dCLi-distances are depicted in Figure 7.2. Notice that the three starting values correspond to long before the
request line, just before the request line, and just before entering the intersection. For every combination of
dcomstop and tcomstop, varied start position for VH was applied as in Section 7.3.1.
dCL (m) 11 31 51
tcomstop (s) 1 2 3
Table 7.1: Values for the communication loss parameters dcomstop – determining how far from the inter-
section communication was cut for VL– and tcomstop – how long communication was cut. These values were
combined to form 9 different test cases.
This test should give an indication on how well the systems are able to handle a lack of new information for
a limited time period at different distances from the intersection.
7.3.4 Test Case: Traffic Offenders (Offender)
Not all vehicles follow traffic rules and conventions, so a robust system has to prevent traffic accidents even if
traffic offenders are present. A traffic offender was simulated by letting VL ignore priorities while still sending
positional messages and other messages required by the protocol. The offender has its intention set to go
throughout the simulation, which implies that the vehicle drives without following the expectation set by
the risk estimator or priorities set by the protocol, and does not respond to triggered emergency breaks. The
test runs had the same starting conditions as in Section 7.3.1 with varying start distance d1. The purpose
of the test is to evaluate the risk estimator in an environment where not all vehicles are adhering to their
safety system, unlike all previous test cases presented here.
7.4 Evaluation terminology
We have developed the following terminology for ease of reading:
• A particular Setup will be denoted S Type . E.G. The RE setup will be denoted SRE .
• A particularTest Case will be denoted T C Type . E.G. The Normal test case will be denoted T CNormal.
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• An Evaluation Scenario will refer to a combination of one test case T C and one setup S, and will
be denoted ES SetupTestCase . E.G. T CNormal paired with SRE+MN will be denoted ES RE+MNNormal .
8 Results
This section presents the results obtained from running the test cases described in Section 7.3 and measuring
the evaluation criteria defined in Section 7.2.
Our initial hypothesis was that SRE+MN would prove to be a more safe system than SRE , which was
confirmed by the results: there were fewer collisions and dangerous situations recorded when using SRE+MN .
This system also reduced the amount of triggered emergency breaks compared to SRE , while still keeping
TLPV low. The Risk Estimator managed to detect all dangerous situations in SRE but was prone to give
false alarms in some test cases.
The Risk Estimator’s performance in SRE+MN is hard to evaluate because of the small number of test runs
that resulted in a dangerous situation. Unfortunately, it is possible that characteristics of the simulation
environment itself may have contributed to some results, since no explanation based on characteristics of the
safety system is available in some cases. For example, the simulations take some time to start up properly
which can affect the cases where one of the vehicles starts close to the intersection.
A variable parameter common to each test case is the start distance for VH , which we denote d1. It
represents the initial spatial separation between the vehicles when compared to the fixed parameter d0.
Instead of plotting the measured entities against d1, another entity is introduced to represent the initial
temporal separation, ∆t. ∆t is defined as the estimated difference in time between when VL and VH will each
reach the intersection based on their initial positions d0 and d1, and the presented speed model for “go” in
Figure 3.3.
8.1 Request Time
Time to Grant (TTG) was calculated as the time difference between when a vehicle started its first request
round and when the request was fully granted. We expect low TTG values for VH (denoted TTG (VH)) since
it has the highest priority and thereby should not have to wait for 〈GRANT 〉 from VL. For VL (denoted
TTG (VL)) we expect a shark-fin pattern in the TTG-∆t plot, with low values for the lowest ∆t, a sudden
jump in TTG when ∆t is low enough for VL to have to wait for VH before crossing the intersection and then
a steady decrease in TTG as VL has to wait shorter and shorter times.
Recorded TTG (VL) and TTG (VH) for ES RE+MNNoise and ES RE+MNComloss can be found in Figure 8.1. The added
noise does not seem to affect TTG if compared to T CNormal used for reference, denoted N : 0, since the
plotted points almost coincide for every value of ∆t. TTG (VH) is close to 0 due to its empty membership,
implying that it does not have to send out any requests. TTG (VL) starts higher than TTG (VH) since VL
reaches the intersection first when ∆t < 0, and thus has to wait for a reply from VH . A slight rise in
TTG (VL) is visible after ∆t = −3 and the plotted points then drop of linearly until they reach a value close
to 0. This drop corresponds to VH estimating that the time gap between them is now too small for VL to
safely perform its manoeuvre without VH slowing down. VL’s requests are thereby rejected until VH leaves
the intersection. Increased ∆t implies that VH starts closer and closer to the intersection and VL thereby
has to wait for shorter and shorter time periods. A slight periodicity in TTG (VH) is distinguishable in the
plot, with peaks at ∆t = −3,−1, and 1. It is unclear what is causing these small periodic changes in TTG.
Similar patterns are present in the communication loss plots to the right in Figure 8.1. Additional features
in these plots includes an initially higher value for TTG (VL), temporary constant TTG instead of declining
linear behaviour and initially declining linear behaviour. The first case occurs for CLD:0, CLP:2, the second
case occurs for CLD:2, CLP:2 and CLD:0, CLP:2, and the third case for CLD:1, CLP:2. Case 1 and 3 are
probably caused by communication loss during the request rounds. For example, in the third case VL is
trying to start a request round when its communication is switched off and it stays off for long enough for
the vehicles to move close enough to produce a too small time gap.
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A slight increase in TTG (VH) occurs after ∆t = 3. This is an effect caused by VH starting in a position
when it has already passed the request line, d1 < dInit, and has to wait for the membership service to update
its membership since a valid membership is needed to start a request round. This effect is thereby most
probably caused by the slow upstart of the simulation environment and not a feature of the system.
SMN resulted in plots similar to SRE+MN and the respective plots have been omitted. The results for TTG
thereby live up to our expectations.
Figure 8.1: Time To Grant (TTG) for ES RE+MNNoise (left) and ES RE+MNComloss (right). V stands for vehicle and
N for noise level in the legend, where N : 0 corresponds to the normal reference setup. TTG (VH)– where
VH has higher priority – is fairly constant and keeps low while TTG (VL) approximates a sharkfin pattern.
The sudden increase in TTG for both vehicles near ∆t = −3 indicates a threshold value, after which VH
estimates that the gap between the two vehicles is too small and – as a result – it should not grant VL.
8.2 Priority Violation Effects
Time Lost due to Priority Violation (TLPV) was estimated for VH by taking the difference between
the actual Time To Intersection (TTI) with the calculated ideal TTI when VH follows the speed model with
the intention “go”. We expect values close to 0 for SMN and SRE+MN for the test cases T CNormal and
T CNoise since the Manoeuvre Negotiation protocol should preserve the initial priorities. In T COffender and
T CComloss, however, we expect to see increased TLPV due to emergency break (EB) and VL’s lost messages.
The measured TLPV for ES RE+MNNoise and ES RE+MNComloss can be found in in Figure 8.2. The different noise levels
tested do not seem to have a visible effect on TLPV when compared to the normal case, denoted N:0. The
shape of the normal curve can also be distinguished in the result plot for the T CComloss when the results
for varied Communication Loss Period (CLP) and the point of started communication loss, defined as
Communication Loss Distance (CLD), are plotted together. Here we see a clear impact of both CLP
and CLD on TLPV. The lower ∆t values, corresponding to VL starting closer to the intersection, are affected
by CLD : 2, which corresponds to communication loss for VL just before entering the intersection. For these
cases, VH has to wait for VL to start communicating again before its request can be granted. In the same
way, CLD:1 gives rise to upgoing trends in the middle of the plot and CLD:0 a bit further right. The different
slopes for the same CLD is caused by different CLP values where the highest CLP, corresponding to CLP:2,
gives the steepest slope.
Figure 8.3 displays the measured TLPV for ES RE+MNOffender. The TLPV has a peak just before ∆t = 0 which is
caused by VH ’s RE triggering an EB due to VL’s unexpected behaviour.
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Figure 8.2: TLPV for ES RE+MNNoise (left) and ES RE+MNComloss (right). In ES RE+MNNoise TLPV is kept below 0.1 s
up for ∆t < 3. A steady rise after ∆t = 3 is present in both plots and is caused by a startup delay in the
simulation. Additional rising trends for different CLD and CLP values are present in ES RE+MNComloss .
Figure 8.3: Time lost due to priority violation for VH for ES RE+MNOffender. Compared to the ES RE+MNNoise in the
left plot in Figure 8.2 this plot has an additional peak just before ∆t = 0, caused by EBs for VH when VL
disobeys priorities and drives out in front of VH .
The results of test cases in SRE are almost identical to SRE+MN and their plots are therefore omitted. There
is one exception, ES MNOffender, which is similar to ES RE+MNNormal since VH is not equipped with a risk estimator
(RE) in this test case.
The TLPV increases rapidly after about ∆t = 3 for all setups and test cases. This is caused by the same
issue as the one explained in Section 8.1, which causes VH to wait for a valid membership. Waiting implies
that the vehicle follows the “stop” speed model and therefore drives slower or even stops and waits just
before the intersection causing a rise in TLPV. Apart from this, the results here matches our expectations
with low TLPV in T CNormal and T CNoise and some higher, but still – for safety reasons – agreeable, values
for T CComloss and T COffender.
8.3 Emergency Break Events
An Emergency Break event happens if the Risk estimator detects a risk over a set threshold. We expect none
or just a few emergency breaks in SRE+MN since the vehicles actively negotiate their internal priority order
and the Risk Estimator is notified of any priority change. In SRE we expect the number of EB triggered by
VH to be higher than the number of EB triggered by VL since VH in this setup is expected to go throughout
the simulation and thereby cannot have an expectation to stop and intention to go – which is what triggers
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an EB.
The mean number of emergency break events for the ES RENoise and ES RE+MNNoise scenarios is plotted in Figure
8.4. In SRE , increased noise seems to reduce the number of emergency breaks. This may be due to less
clear intention caused by lack of new information, leading to a more evened out distribution of estimated
intentions and expectations and less mismatch between the two. VL shows a low number of emergency breaks
which is expected since it is the lower priority vehicle and in an ideal case should not rise any alarms when
the higher priority vehicle approaches the intersection. That emergency breaks are at all recorded for VL
may be caused by random functions used in the risk estimator and its gap model or due to randomness in
the simulation.
In ES RE+MNNoise , just a few emergency breaks were recorded and out of these no mean exceeded 1 for any
∆t. This implies that on average less than 1 emergency break per run was recorded per measurement set of
10 runs. The reason why almost no emergency breaks were triggered is because the manoeuvre negotiation
protocol used in SRE+MN enables the vehicles to be aware of the other vehicle’s intention and also informs
the risk estimator of any priority change. In a best case scenario we would expect no emergency breaks but
the few recorded is probably again due to randomness connected to the risk estimator or the simulation.
Figure 8.4: Mean number of emergency breaks for T CNormal (N:0), and T CNoise (N:x) for VL and VH
seen in the legend as V:0 and V:1. The left plot is the result from SRE and the right plot is from SRE+MN .
Higher noise levels seem to lead to less number of emergency breaks. In SRE+MN just a few emergency
breaks were triggered. Notice that 0.1 implies 1 triggered emergency break in 10 runs.
In ES REComloss a drastic drop in emergency breaks by VH can be seen when VL stops communicating in the
intersection, labelled as CLD:2 in the left plot in Figure 8.5. The largest drop is achieved for the longest
communication loss period, denoted CLP:2. The result from ES RE+MNComloss is displayed to the right in Figure
8.5. Here, we see an increase in the mean number of emergency breaks when compared to ES RE+MNNormal in
Figure 8.4. However, most data points still lies beneath 1 and much lower than SRE .
8.4 TTCP Upon First Emergency Break
The Time To Collision Point (TTCP) for a vehicle is calculated when the first emergency break (EB) is
triggered to give a measure of how far in advance a potential can be detected. We expect that if any EB are
triggered then they will occur when the other vehicle reach a certain distance from the intersection since the
vehicles strictly follow the speed models. This would result in a declining TTCP since it is measured for the
vehicle that triggered the EB.
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Figure 8.5: Mean number of emergency breaks for the ES REComloss, left, and ES RE+MNComloss , right, for VL
and VH for different communication loss periods (CLP) with varying start of the communication loss, CLD.
The number of emergency breaks in ES REComloss is drastically reduced when VL stops communicating in the
intersection, corresponding to CLD:2. More emergency breaks were recorded in ES REComloss compared to
ES RENormal, as seen in the left plot of Figure 8.4.
The results for ES RENormal, ES RENoise and ES REComloss is plotted in Figure 8.6. All three test cases show a
similar linear decline of about -1 for VH when ∆t < 0 which indicates that the EB is triggered when VL is at
approximately the same distance from the intersection in each case, approximately 1 s away from reaching
the intersection. A decrease in TTCP is visible for T CComloss for increasing communication loss time (CLP)
for VH with CLD : 2, corresponding to communication loss for VL when entering the intersection. Both
plots show a few false alarms for ∆t > 0 for VL, and a lot of late alarms (TTCP< 0) for ∆t < 0. T COffender
is similar to T CNormal and SRE+MN is similar to SRE but with less data points, so these plots are omitted.
The linear decline of TTCP for VH matches our expectation that the detection would occur when VH reaches
a certain distance from the intersection. The late EB triggered by VL was not expected and may have been
caused by unpredictability or implementation flaw of the risk estimator.
8.5 Collisions and Dangerous Situations
Collisions between the two vehicles was calculated as when both vehicles at the same time were inside the area
common to their trajectories if considering the vehicle width. A dangerous situation occurred if their fronts
where closer than 4m apart, which implies that collisions are a subset of dangerous situations. We expect
to see no collisions and at most a few dangerous situations in SRE+MN and SMN except for in T COffender
where VH may not have enough time to detect and stop for the offender (in SRE+MN ). Collisions may on
the other hand be present in SRE since the Risk Estimator has a best effort approach to safety.
The number of recorded collisions and dangerous situations for different Evaluation Scenarios can be found
in Table 8.1. SMN and SRE+MN yielded lower values than SRE in all cases. SMN resulted in less collisions
than SRE+MN while SRE+MN resulted in less dangerous situations than SMN . The highest number of
collisions and dangerous situations for SRE seems to occur when a communication loss occurs just before VL
reaches the request line.
The collisions in the SRE+MN scenario occurred in ES RE+MNOffender, which was expected, but also in ES RE+MNComloss ,
which was not expected. Either, the longest period of communication loss for VL in ES RE+MNComloss prevented
both the Risk Estimator and Manoeuvre Negotiation protocol from keeping the vehicle safe in this one case,
or this collision was caused by an undetected error in during the simulations. SRE resulted in a significantly
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Figure 8.6: Time To Collision Point (TTCP) for the earliest EB for ES RENormal and ES RENoise (left) and
ES REComloss (right). Both figures show a linearly declining TTCP with increasing ∆t < 0 for VH and a few
false alarms (where ∆t > 0).
higher amount of collisions and dangerous situations as expected.
Collision-RE Collision-MN Collision-RE+MN Danger-RE Danger-MN Danger-RE+MN
Normal 5 0 0 9 0 0
N0 5 0 0 8 1 0
N1 1 0 0 8 0 0
O 2 1 2 4 4 3
CL0-0 5 0 0 8 1 0
CL0-1 3 0 0 9 1 0
CL0-2 4 0 0 8 1 0
CL1-0 2 0 0 9 0 0
CL1-1 4 0 0 10 0 0
CL1-2 7 0 0 9 2 0
CL2-0 3 0 0 7 2 0
CL2-1 4 0 0 9 0 0
CL2-2 2 0 1 8 1 1
Table 8.1: Number of test cases that resulted in a collision or a dangerous situation in SRE , SMN , and
SRE+MN for the T CNormal (N0), T CNoise (Nx), T COffender (O), and T CComloss (CLX-Y). The maximum
value is 29 corresponding to at least one collision or dangerous situation in all cases with different start
distance d1. SMN and SRE+MN resulted in much less collisions and dangerous situations than SRE .
8.6 Risk Estimator Recall and Precision
For the Risk Estimator’s Emergency Breaks, recall was evaluated as total number of tests where an EB was
triggered during a dangerous situation divided by the total number of cases where a dangerous situation
occurred. Precision was calculated as the number of true dangerous situations that were detected and
triggered an EB divided by the total number of cases were an EB was triggered. We expect a high Recall
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since the vehicles follow the same motion patterns as the Risk Estimator uses to infer their manoeuvre
intention.
Recall and precision values for SRE and SRE+MN are presented in Table 8.2. VH has a recall value of 1.0
in SRE for all test cases, which implies that it was able to detect all dangerous situations despite increased
noise, communication loss, and the other vehicle ignoring priorities. However, the lower precision results
implies that the Risk Estimator is prone to rise false alarms. Safety is prioritised over false alarms by the
Risk Estimator when run by itself. The result for SRE+MN is less clear since only a few dangerous situations
were recorded for this setup, see Table 8.1.
In SRE we got high recall values as expected while more tests will have to be run in order to get a more
reliable values for SRE+MN .
Recall-RE Recall-RE+MN Precision-RE Precision-RE+MN
Normal 0.56/1.0 -/- 0.28/0.50 -/-
N0 0.44/1.0 -/- 0.22/0.50 0.0/0.0
N1 0.38/1.0 -/- 0.18/0.47 -/-
O 1.0/1.0 0.67/1.0 0.19/0.19 0.10/0.15
CL0-0 1.0/1.0 -/- 0.4/0.4 -/-
CL0-1 1.0/1.0 -/- 0.38/0.38 -/-
CL0-2 0.75/1.0 -/- 0.29/0.38 0.0/0.0
CL1-0 0.78/1.0 -/- 0.32/0.41 -/-
CL1-1 0.50/1.0 -/- 0.24/0.48 0.0/0.0
CL1-2 0.89/1.0 -/- 0.33/0.38 0.0/0.0
CL2-0 1.0/1.0 -/- 0.33/0.33 0.0/0.0
CL2-1 0.44/1.0 -/- 0.21/0.47 0.0/0.0
CL2-2 0.25/1.0 1.0/0.0 0.12/0.47 0.5/0.0
Table 8.2: Recall and precision results for SRE and SRE+MN where values separated with a “/” are the
values for VL and VH respectively. A “-” signifies that no value could be computed due to a lack of dangerous
situations or emergency breaks. The Risk Estimator performs better on Recall compared to Precision and
VH detects all dangerous situations in SRE .
9 Discussion
9.1 Preservation of the Original Traffic Rules
Traffic rules and conventions are designed not only to make driving more safe but also to promote fairness
and a high traffic flow. It is therefore important that our combined safety system tries to adhere to the
traffic rules and conventions.
It is worth noting that a vehicle pi following the protocol will only grant another vehicle pj if pi predicts
that pj will not interfere with pi’s intended manoeuvre. This is an egoistic approach, since pi is not prepared
to slow down for a lower priority vehicle to, for example, increase the overall throughput. Further more,
pj will only ask pi if pi is in pj ’s membership – pi has higher priority than pj , where lower priority reflects
which vehicle that according to the traffic rules should give-way. The combination of the egoistic approach
to answering a request and the composition of the memberships therefore implies that the protocol in a
failure free traffic situation should preserve priorities set by the traffic rules. This is also shown in the
simulations, Figure 8.2, where the priority vehicle is shown to slow down for the lower priority vehicle only
if communication is lost during the request rounds.
38
Figure 9.1: An example of conflicting manoeuvres in red – both vehicles turning left – and non-conflicting
trajectories in black – both vehicles turning right.
9.2 Suggested extensions
The Manoeuvre Negotiation Protocol was extended during this project and more extensions are possible.
Some of the ones we have identified includes
• Allowing multiple granted vehicles. The presented version of the protocol only allows a vehicle
to grant one other vehicle at the time. A possible way of extending the protocol to allow multiple held
grants without reducing safety is to divide the intersection into multiple critical sections instead of just
one by defining conflicting manoeuvres, see Figure 9.1. An agent receiving a request can thereby base
its decision to grant or deny on if the intended manoeuvres overlap in time and space. For example, two
vehicles coming from opposite directions that both intend on doing a left turn through an intersection
will have conflicting manoeuvres, while if they both intend on doing a right turn then their manoeuvres
are not conflicting.
• Extending to more traffic situations. So far we have only tested the protocol on intersections and
it would be interesting to see how well it performs in other traffic situations. It is possible to extend the
priority matrix (Section 3.2.1) to be valid for roundabouts, merging lanes and possibly general roads to
indicate how the traffic priorities are set up and how the memberships for the manoeuvre negotiation
should be composed. An extension would also have to be made to the speed models to capture normal
driving patterns in these situations.
• Periodically changing the default priorities for fairness and deadlock avoidance. The default
priorities are static in our simulations to reflect the rules in an unsignalled intersection. An extention to
signalled intersections could potentially be simulated by letting the default priorities change, indicating
a change of priority road. This change would only have to be made by the membership service and
would be made present to the vehicles by a changed membership. Changing the default priorities is
also a way of increasing fairness and avoiding deadlocks for lower priority vehicles when there is a
continuous flow of vehicles on the priority road.
9.3 Suggested further testing
• Varied turns and intersections. There are more turn combinations than going straight and turning
left that may cause collisions in an intersection. It would therefore be beneficial to run more tests with
different combinations of manoeuvre intentions. There are also many more intersection types than
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just 4-way give-way intersections which also could be constructed in our simulation environment and
tested.
• Recorded real driving data. Using real driving data instead of relying on speed models and fixed
paths could give a better indication on our system’s performance in real traffic scenarios. Recorded
data from real vehicles in a 4-way, give-way intersection would then be needed to conduct the tests.
The PID-controller on every vehicle in the simulation could be set to follow the recorded path and the
recorded speed could function as a speed model.
• Network simulator. A network simulator could be used to simulate packet delays and message loss
in a more realistic way. Packets sent in our setup in ROS are delivered instantly without any delay
which would never happen in a real traffic scenario.
• Multiple vehicles. It could also be worth testing the system’s performance when more then 2 vehicles
are approaching the intersection, especially if a multi-grant version of the protocol is developed. Adding
more vehicles to the simulation would make the intersection more busy and it would be interesting to
evaluate the safety and throughput in this scenario as well.
9.4 Deadlock avoidance
Deadlocks are possible in this system since the four conditions for causing deadlocks: mutual exclusion,
resource holding, no preemption, and circular wait [5] could be present in the system if the algorithm is
not designed properly. Mutual exclusion is used for the whole (or in possible extensions: parts of) the
intersection. Resource holding may occur since vehicles requesting for a permission may be required to get
a grant from more than one vehicle and vehicles are only allowed to grant one vehicle at the time. No
preemption is present if explicit release (section 3.1) is used since the grant is held until a release message is
received or the granted vehicle has left the intersection. Circular wait is possible if more than one vehicle are
sending their requests concurrently since vehicles are only allowed to grant one vehicle at any time and grants
from all expected respondents are required to get permission to perform the manoeuvre. As an example of
a deadlock situation: Lets call two agents that concurrently send requests piandpj . If pi’s and pj ’s sets of
requires responses have at least two agents in common, say pa and pb then pi may get a grant from pa while
pj gets a grant from pb due to message delays. Agent pa then have to deny pj since only one grant can be
given at any time, and the same applies to pb’s response to pi’s request. If pi’s request is newer then pi will
release its request and grant pj instead. But pi will also release its request since it will receive a deny from
pb and the whole process starts over again.
Mutual exclusion for the intersection is vital for avoiding collisions so efforts should not be put there to
remove that deadlock conditions. Getting a grant from every vehicle expected to answer is also a key feature
to ensure safety, but it could potentially be possible to grant multiple vehicles and still avoid collisions.
However, without multiple grants, what could be avoided is circular wait. If the vehicle with the newest
request can be made to back off for a time long enough (TA + 2TD) for the vehicle with the newest request
to get a grant then circular wait will not be possible anymore.
Intersections also have pre-defined priorities which can have an impact on formations of deadlocks. Us-
ing time stamps to set priorities of requests enables the avoidance of these deadlocks if the function
noPriorityViolationDynamic takes the pre-defined rules into account. A vehicle with a non-empty member-
ship and that has not been fully granted should have the intention to stop and is not allowed to enter the
intersection. This vehicle should therefore release its current request if it receives another request with an
earlier time stamp.
10 Conclusion
In this thesis, a Manoeuvre Negotiation protocol intended for increasing the safety for autonomous vehicles
have been presented. A correctness proof was supplied where the requirements set on the protocol was shown
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to be fulfilled. The requirements stated limitation on the completeness of memberships, when manoeuvre
negotiating requests can be initiated, how agents should answer to requests, when a grant should be released,
and when an agent is allowed to enter the intersection.
Our simulations further show that the setups with the Manoeuvre Negotiation protocol (MN) used with or
without the Risk Estimator (RE) are able to avoid collisions in more cases than when using merely RE. A
higher priority vehicle equipped with a RE was shown to be able to detect all risky situation even in the
presence additional noise, and communication loss. However, the detection of the risky situation was in
many cases not made early enough for the vehicle to be able to break to avoid a collision. The throughput
for the higher priority vehicle when MN was activated was further shown to just marginally deviate from the
ideal case which also implies that the protocol preserves the priorities set by the traffic rules. Our combined
system thereby states an example of how vehicle-to-vehicle communication can be used alongside existing
safety systems to increase safety for autonomous vehicles.
Finally, possibilities in ways to extend to the protocol and additional testing methods were provided. Possible
extensions included allowing vehicles to concurrently grant more than one vehicle at the time and broadening
the scope in which the protocol can be used. Further testing is recommended to focus more on varying the
driving patterns of the vehicle or even use reordered data from real vehicles to run the vehicles in the
simulations.
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A An alternative implementation of noPriorityViolationStrict
The purpose of noPriorityViolationStrict is to determine if a priority violation can possibly occur between two
vehicles when priorities are static. To draw the right conclusion, the algorithm has to consider both normal
and extreme driving behaviour, which can be done with the help of occupancy prediction [1]. The main idea
of occupancy prediction is to, given a start state of an agent, provide an upper limit to the agent’s position
some time later using constraints on vehicle motion.
Pseudocode for noPriorityViolationStrict is given in 4. The procedure takes four input parameters including
the agent states of two vehicles, pi and pj , the time from which calculations should begin, t, and a time step
δt. The states pi and pj are used to compute the initial occupancy area O0i and O0j at the time t.
An occupancy area Oki covers every possible position the agent represented by pi can have in the time interval
for which it was computed. Both physical and legal constraints, such as limited engine power and speed
limits [1], can be applied to predict Oki from Ok−1i . The pseudocode uses the interface getOccupancyArea
to calculate these areas.
The implementation approach for noPriorityViolationStrict considers the intersection of the occupancy areas
Oki ∩ Okj for consecutive time intervals ∆tk = [t + kδt, t + (k + 1)δt], where k = 0, 1, 2.... Traffic priorities
are preserved by letting an agent pk grant a request from another agent pj if, and only if, Oki ∩ Okj =
∅∀k ∈ [0,M ] : ((hasLeftIntersection(OMi )∨hasLeftIntersection(OMj ))∧(¬hasLeftIntersection(OM−1i )∧
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¬hasLeftIntersection(OM−1j )), that is, ∆tM is the first time interval after which pi or pj is guaranteed to
have left the intersection.
Further constraints in the predicted vehicle motions can be applied if multiple vehicles are present in a traffic
scene [10]. Let {pi}i=0N be N vehicles in a queue on a one-lane road where p1 is the leading vehicle. The
occupation areas Aj(pi)∀i ∈ [2,M ] will then be bounded in the forward direction by Aj(p1) at any time
instant j as long as the road does not expand to a multi-lane road.
The presented approach should be able to predict all possible priority violations caused by predictable vehicle
motion since the approach relies on the physical constraints of the vehicle. We define predictable vehicle
motion as all kinds of driving in the absence of rare natural events such as appearing sink holes, rockfall,
sudden flooding etc, which can cause the vehicle to move in unexpected ways.
This version of noPriorityViolation was selected to be used by the membership service to ensure that a
membership for an agent pi contains all other vehicles that could potentially cause a priority violation with
pi. However, this approach is not efficient regarding throughput in normal traffic situations where most
vehicles follow normal trajectory and speed patterns. We therefore decided to employ another version of
noPriorityViolation based on behaviour models and intersection occupancy intervals for making the grant or
deny decision. This version is presented in Section 3.2.5.
Algorithm 4: noPriorityViolationStrict relying on static priorities.
1 Structures:
2 AgentState = (ta, x, v, a); // timestamp, position, velocity, acceleration
3
4 Interfaces:
5 getOccupancyArea(ts, tf , p): ;
6 hasLeftIntersection(O(p)): returns True if all predicted states of p, O(p), are outside and moving away from the intersection;
7
8 procedure noPriorityViolationStrict(pi, pj , t, δt) begin
9 let tc = t;
10 let Oi = getOccupancyArea(pi.ts, t, pi);
11 let Oj = getOccupancyArea(pj .ts, t, pj);
12 while ¬(hasLeftIntersection(Oi) ∨ hasLeftIntersection(Oj)) do
13 let Oi = getOccupancyArea(tc, tc + δt,Oi);
14 let Oj = getOccupancyArea(tc, tc + δt,Oj);
15 if Oi ∩ Oj 6= ∅ then return False;
16 let tc = tc + δt;
17 return True;
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